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ATTORNEYS' FEES, THE NLRB, AND
THE EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT:
FROM BAD TO WORSE
Risa L Lieberwitz*
INTRODUCTION

The National Labor Relations Board's (NLRB) power to remedy the
effects of unfair labor practices is expressed in Section 10(c) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, (NLRA), as the power to
take "such affirmative action... as will effectuate the policies of this
Act.... ."I The breadth and generality of this provision, however, creates
uncertainty regarding the actual scope of the Board's remedial power.
Unquestionably, the Board may order reinstatement and back pay, issue
cease and desist orders, bargaining orders, and orders for remedial notice
posting. 2 The Board's authority to order less traditional remedies, however, has been the subject of debate and has led to extensive litigation.3
In particular, though not explicitly provided for in Section 10(c), the
NLRB has awarded attorneys' fees and litigation expenses to the charging
party4 in certain unfair labor practice proceedings. The rationale for such
awards against violators of the NLRA has evolved into a distinction
between respondents who raise "frivolous" defenses, in which case the
Board will award attorneys' fees, as opposed to respondents with "debat* Assistant Professor, Department of Collective Bargaining, Labor Law and Labor History, New
York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University. B.A., University of
Florida, 1976; J.D., University of Florida, 1979.
The author would like to thank her research assistant David S. Bahn, for his invaluable assistance in
the writing of this article.
1. 29 U.S.C. §160(c).
2.

See infra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.

3.

See infra notes 114-83 and accompanying text.

4.

The term "charging party" refers to the private party filing unfair labor practice charges with

a regional office of the NLRB. If the region issues a complaint, the charging party remains as a party
in the Board litigation. The charging party may be an individual, a union, an employer, or other

entity. The "respondent" refers to the party, either an employer or a union, charged with the
commission of an unfair labor practice.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1984

1

Hofstra Labor
Employment
Law JournalLaw Journal, Vol. 2, Iss.
[Vol. 12:1[1984], Art. 1
Labor
Hofstraand

able" defenses, against whom the Board refuses to order attorneys' fees. 5
Since 1972, when the Board first awarded attorneys' fees, in Tiidee Products, Inc.,6 the Board has taken a timid and conservative approach to
7
awarding such fees.
Despite the Board's repeated application of its frivolous versus
debatable defenses standard, the underlying question remains regarding
the Board's authority to award attorneys? fees. This question was specifically reserved by the United States Supreme Court in 1974,8 and was
recently revived in a case involving J.P. Stevens & Company. 9 In the
Stevens case, the Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari on the
question of the Board's authority to award attorneys' fees under Section
10(c). 10 The Court again left the question open, however, remanding the
case for further consideration in light of another recent Supreme Court
decision. 1
Another recent statutory development in the area of attorneys' fees
awards has affected NLRB proceedings; this time, however, from the
direction of fee awards to respondents and against the agency. Under the
Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA),12 which was effective October 1,
1981, a prevailing party in litigation against the federal government will
be awarded attorneys' fees, unless the government proves that its position
was substantiallyjustified or where special circumstances would render an
award unjust. 13 The EAJA applies to civil proceedings before agencies
and federal courts where the federal government is a party. 14 Since its
enactment, both agencies and federal courts have interpreted various
provisions of the EAJA, including the definition of the parties eligible for
fee awards and the meaning of statutory terms such as the "position" of
the government in litigation and whether the government had "substantial
justification" for its position. 15 Much litigation has involved the NLRB,
which is a party to over half of the administrative proceedings covered by
16
the EAJA.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 116-50. The term "attorneys' fees" ordered by the NLRB
will be used to refer to attorneys' fees and other litigation expenses, such as witness fees, expert
witness fees and incidential expenses incurred in litigation.
6. 194 N.L.R.B. 1234,79 L.R.R.M. 1175 (1972) (supplemental decision).
7. See infra notes 184-241 and accompanying text.
8. Food Store Employees, Local 347 v. NLRB, 417 U.S. 1,n.9 (1974).
9. J.P. Stevens & Co., Inc. v. NLRB, 244 N.L.R.B. 407,102 L.R.R.M. 1039 (1979), enforced,
668 F.2d 767 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. granted,.... U.S.-...., 102 S.Ct. 3505 (1982).
10. J.P. Stevens & Co., Inc. v. NLRB, -U.S._., 102 S.Ct. 3505 (1982).
Id.
See infra text accompanying notes 156-61.
11.
12. Pub. L. No. 96-481, §§203(a) (1), 204(a), 94 Stat. 2325, 2327 (1980) (codified as 5 U.S.C.
§504 (Supp. VI'1982); 28 U.S.C. §2412 (Supp. V 1981)).

13. 5 U.S.C. §504(a) (1) (Supp. VI 1982); 28 U.S.C. §2412(d)(1)(A) (Supp. V 1981).
(Supp. VI 1982); 28 U.S.C. §2412(b), (d) (Supp. V 1981).
14. 5 U.S.C. §504(a) (1)
15. See infra notes 378-90 and accompanying text.
16. NLRB General Counsel on EqualAccess to Justice Act-The First Year, Memorandum
GC 83-11, 113 LAB. REL REP. (BNA) 111, 112 n.1 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Memorandum GC
83-11].
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This article will examine the issues encompassed in the area of
awards of attorneys' fees to parties in proceedings before the NLRB. The
study will, therefore, include analysis of fee shifting under Section 10(c)
against respondents who have violated the NLRA as well as fee shifting
under the EAJA to respondents who have prevailed in litigation against
the Board. The article will first examine the American Rule and the
common law and statutory exceptions to the policy against fee shifting.
The NLRB's approach to fee shifting will be studied against this general
background, with particular emphasis on the policy considerations underlying theories of the Board's remedial power under Section 10(c). The
resolution of issues of the existence of Board authority to award fees and
the scope of that power will also entail a discussion of the Board's fee
awards in light of relevant Supreme Court decisions and as compared
with fee shifting in the federal courts.
Following the study of fee shifting under Section 10(c), the article
will focus on fee awards under the EAJA, including a critical analysis of
the statutory provisions and the legislative history. Next, the article will
study the implementation of the EAJA, with particular emphasis on
NLRB proceedings in examining whether the EAJA is necessary or
appropriate in light of historical fee shifting policies. This study will
analyze the relaxed standard of proof for fee awards for both prevailing
plaintiffs and defendants under the EAJA and the burden of proof placed
on the government, as well as the purported justifications for these
provisions.
After completing the separate studies of attorneys' fees awards under
the NLRA and the EAJA, the statutes will be compared. This comparative analysis will focus primarily on the different standards of proof under
each statute, resulting in a far more stringent standard of proof for fee
awards against violators of the NLRA than against prevailing respondents before the Board. The divergent standards will be analyzed and
critiqued against the background of fee shifting policies generally, and
particularly in the context of the public policies and equities underlying
vigorous enforcement of the NLRA.
FEE SHIFTING AND THE AMERICAN RULE

Fee shifting in the United States is controlled by the "American
Rule," which generally prohibits federal courts from awarding attorneys'
fees to a party in litigation, absent a common law or statutory exception.1 7 As a federal tribunal, therefore, the NLRB must formulate policies
on fee shifting in light of the American Rule. Thus, a study of the Board's
authority to award attorneys' fees under Section 10(c) of the NLRA
logically begins the examinafion of the American Rule and its exceptions.
17. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. The Wilderness Soc'y, et al., 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975);
Another exception to the American Rule is found in a contractual authorization, Hall v. Cole, 412
U.S. 1, 4(1973); Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 717 (1967).
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The American Rule has been applied by the federal courts since
1796.18 This policy developed in opposition to the long standing English
practice which regularly allows attorneys' fees to the prevailing party. 19

Underlying the American Rule is the basic value that poor litigants
should be able to litigate meritorious claims free of the deterrent effect
that fee shifting inevitably would have on their willingness to file suit.20 A
related reason for disallowing fee shifting is that attorneys' fee awards
would constitute an unwarranted penalty against a party who chooses to
engage in litigation.21 Further bases cited in support of the American Rule
include the time-consuming and expensive judicial process of litigating
the fee question itself22 and the potential compromise of ". . . the principle of independent advocacy.., by having 'the earnings of the attorney

flow from the pen of the judge before whom he argues.' m2
Critics of the American Rule contend that the prevailing party is not

fully compensated unless the losing party is also assessed litigation
expenses. 24 Further, critics of the American Rule allege that the policy
against fee shifting prevents poor litigants from litigating meritorious
claims because of the difficulties of retaining an attorney. 25 Regardless of
the merits of the arguments against fee shifting, however, the American
Rule is firmly entrenched in the federal courts. As the Supreme Court
stated, "[t]he general practice of United States is in oposition [sic] to [fee

shifting]; and even if that practice were not strictly correct in principle, it is
entitled to the respect of the court, till it is changed, or modified, by
statute."

26

18. In 1796, the United States Supreme Court first announced the American Rule in Arcambel
v. Wisemann, I U.S. (3 Dall.) 306 (1796); See Note, Attorney's Fees and the Federal Bad Faith
Exception, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 319, 320 (1977).
19. Id.
20. Summit Valley Indus. v. Local 112, 456 U.S. 717, 725 (1982); Note, supra note 18 at 321
(citing Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967)).
21. Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714,718 (1967); Note, supra
note 18 at 321.
22. Summit Valley Indus. v. Local 112,456 U.S. 717,725 (1982); Fleischmann Distilling Corp.
v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967); Note, supranote 18, at 321.
23. Summit Valley Indus. v. Local 112, 456 U.S. 717, 725 (1982) (quoting F.D. Rich Co. v.
United States ex rel. Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 128-29 (1974)).
24. Id.; Note, supra note 18 at 321, (citing Kuenzel, The Attorney's Fee: Why Not a Cost of
Litigation?, 49 IowA L. REV. 75 (1963)). Numerous other commentators have criticized the
application of the American Rule. See, e.g., Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement of Counsel Fees and the
Great Society, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 792 (1966); Greenberger, The Cost of Justice: An American
Problem.An English Solution, 9 VILL L. REv. 400 (1964); Stoebuck, Counsel Fees Includedin Costs:
A Logical Development, 38 U. COLO. L. REV. 202 (1966); McCormick, Counsel Fees and Other
Expenses of Litigation as an Element of Damages, 15 MINN. L. REv. 619 (1931); Note, Attorney's
Fees, Where Shall the Ultimate Burden Lie?, 20 VAND. L. REV. 1216 (1967).
25. Note, supra note 18 at 321.
26. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. The Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240,249-50 (1975) (quoting
Arcambel v. Wisemann, I U.S. (3 DalI.) 306, 306 (1796)). The Alveska Court noted that the "early
holding" of Arcambel has been consistently followed. 421 U.S. at 250.
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Despite the apparent breadth of the American Rule, the United
States Supreme Court has reaffirmed repeatedly that federal courts may
exercise their inherent equitable powers to award attorneys' fees "when
the interests of justice so require" 27 and "whenever 'the overriding considerations indicate the need for such a recovery.' "28 These policy considerations have resulted in well-established common law exceptions to the
American Rule, embodied in the bad faith and common fund exceptions. 29

The bad faith exception is broadly defined as the award of attorneys'
fees to a prevailing party when the opposing party has acted "in bad faith,
vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons. ' 0 The award of fees
under this exception is punitive,31 as it punishes the unsuccessful litigant
for its "unreasonably obdurate behavior."3 2 Fee shifting for bad faith
actions is also considered an unusual remedy, requiring the prevailing
party to meet a strict standard of proof of bad faith conduct. 33

A party may act in bad faith either in conduct underlying the initiation of the lawsuit or in conduct during the course of the litigation.3 4 In
the first instance, attorneys' fees may be awarded against a party which
unreasonably refuses to recognize the clear legal rights of another, leading
inevitably to a lawsuit.35 The more frequent case, though, involves the
27. Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1973). The Supreme Court stated that "the power to award
such fees 'is part of the original authority of the chancellor to do equity in a particular situation,'" Id.
(quoting Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 166 (1939)). The Court's quotation refers to the
origin of federal equity jurisdiction from the English Court of Chancery, which had the discretion to
apply its notions of justice to award litigation expenses to one of the litigants. Note, Awards of
Attorney's Fees in the FederalCourts, 56 ST. JOHNS L. REV. 277, 279 n.5 (1982) [hereinafter cited as
Awards]. The equity power of the English Chancery Courts was given to the federal equity courts by
the Judiciary Act of 1789, Act of Sept. 27, Ch. 20, 1Stat. 73. Note, supra note 18, at 324 and at n.34.
28. Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1973) (quoting Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375,
391-92 (1970)). See also Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. The Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 259
(1975); Summit Valley Indus. v. Local 112,456 U.S. 717, 721 (1982).
29. As discussed infra, at note 44, the common fund exception has evolved and expanded to
include the "substantial benefit" exception as well. Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5-6, n.7 (1972). The
substantial benefit exception, however, also has been cited as a separate common law exception.
ATrORNEY'S FEES: A LEGAL SERVICES PRACrICE MANUAL (Cal. Rural Legal Assistance, Inc.) (1981)
[hereinafter cited as LEGAL SERVICES MANUAL].

30. Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1973).
31. Id. Note, supranote 18 at 320-31; Awards,supra note 27, at 281.
32. F.D. Rich Co. v. Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129 (1974).
33. Note, supra note 18, at 331; Awards, supra note 27, at 284. Thus, causes of action or
defenses with a reasonable basis or genuine dispute of law or fact would not be subject to a finding of
bad faith conduct. Id. See, e.g., Nemeroffv. Abelson, 620 F.2d 339 (2d Cir. 1980); Adams v. Carlson,
521 F.2d 168 (7th Cir. 1975).
34. Note, supra note 18, at 324-35; Awards, supra note 27, at 282-83; LEGAL SERVICES
MANUAL, supranote 29 at 1/15. For an extensive list of cases illustrating each category, see Awards,
supra note 26, at 282-83 nn.18-19.
35. See, e.g., Bell v. School Bd. of Powhatan County, 321 F.2d 494 (4th Cir. 1963) (plaintiffs'
suit was caused by the school board's prolonged "evasion and obstruction" of desegregation many
years after Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)). See also Rolax v. Atlantic Coast Line
R.R., 186 F.2d 473 (4th Cir. 1951) (labor union sued by some of its members for racial
discrimination).
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second category, where a party acts in bad faith during the course of
litigation. 36 These actions include the filing of frivolous lawsuits, 37 asser-

tion of frivolous defenses, 38 dilatory conduct, 39 unnecessary motions or

petitions, and generally, n° vexatious or wanton conduct throughout the
suit.41 The federal courts' equitable powers extend as well to attorneys
42
who engage in bad faith litigation.
Under the "common fund" exception to the American Rule, a federal court may award attorneys' fees to a successful plaintiff whose litiga43
tion creates a "common fund" shared by members of a certain group,
This fee award avoids unjust enrichment by those who benefit from the
results of the plaintiff's actions without having contributed to the litigation costs."4
With the expansion of public interest statutes, 45 the federal courts
during the early 1970s sought to exercise their inherent equitable powers
even further, by awarding attorneys' fees to plaintiffs viewed by the courts
36. LEGAL SERVICES MANUAL, supra note 28, at 1/15.
37. See, e.g., Guardian Trust Co. v. Kansas City Southern Ry., 28 F.2d 233, 246 (8th Cir.
1928), rev'd on other grounds, 281 U.S. 1, 10 (1930); Stratton Group, Ltd. v. Sprayregen, 466 F.
Supp. 1180, 1186 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Flora v. Moore, 461 F. Supp. 1104, 1120-22 (N.D. Miss. 1978).
38. See, e.g., Lewis v. Texaco, Inc., 418 F. Supp, 27, 28 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
39. See, e.g., Gates v. Collier, 70 F.R.D. 341, 345 (N.D. Miss. 1976).
40. See, e.g., Baas v. Elliot, 71 F.R.D. 693, 694 (N.D. Miss. 1976); Local 149, United
Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers of Am. v. American Brake Shoe Co., 298
F.2d 212, 214-15 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,369 U.S. 873 (1962).
41. See, e.g., Red School House, Inc. v. Office of Economic Opportunity, 386 F. Supp. 1177,
1197 (D. Minn. 1974) (fees awarded based on OEO's obdure, uncooperative conduct and "defiant
attitude" during litigation); Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527 (1962) (fees awarded based on
defendant's willful and persistent refusal to recognize unquestionable claim).
42. Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752 (1980) (federal court may assess attorneys'
fees against an attorney who intentionally abused the judicial process). See also Awards, supranote
27, at 282 and n. 16; Comment, Awards ofAtorneys'Fees Against Attorneys: Roadway Express,Inc.
v. Piper,60 B.U.L. REV. 950 (1980).
43. Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472,47-81 (1980); Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5-7, and
n.7 (1973; Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527,531-32 (1881); LEGAL SERVICES MANUAL, supra note
29, at 1/12; Awards, supra note 27, at 280-81. The benefited group must be small in number and
easily identifiable, allowing for apportionment of costs with some certainty. LEGAL SERVICES
MANUAL, supranote 29, at 1/12.
44. l. The plaintiff need not sue as representative of a class to recoup attorneys' fees from the
fund; the establishment of the right of others to recover from specific assets of the same defendant is
sufficient. Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161 (1939); Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, n.7 (1973).
Further, the common fund exception has evolved and expanded to encompass the "substantial
benefit" exception, where the plaintiff's successful litigation may create monetary or nonpecuniary
benefits for others. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 393-97 (1970). See Hall v. Cole, 412
U.S. 1 (1973) (where the Court traces the evolution and expansion of the common fund exception to
the broad parameters of the substantial benefit exception). Id. at 5-7, n.7. Even when the benefits are
not monetary, the plaintiff is entitled to contribution to the fee award from the members of the
benefited class. 1d; LEGAL SERVICES MANUAL, supranote 29, at 1/13-1/14.
45. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §1982 (1970); 42 U.S.C. §1983 (1970); 42 U.S.C. §2000 C (1970); 42
U.S.C. §3612 (c) (1970).
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as "private attorneys general." 46 Thus, the federal courts sought to
encourage private litigants to enforce public rights created by statute, by
awarding attorneys' fees to the successful plaintiffs who "had acted to
vindicate 'important statutory rights of all citizens.. ."47 and who "had
ensured that the governmental system functioned properly."48 The need to
encourage private parties to file suit to enforce public statutory rights was
found particularly important where the successful plaintiff could receive
only non-monetary relief such as an injunction.4 9 Under these circumstances, potential litigants would be deterred from filing suit because of
the cost of litigation against well-financed defendants; furthermore, nonwealthy litigants would have difficulty finding an attorney willing to file
50
suit in such a case.
The "private attorney general" theory met its demise, however, in
Alyeska PipelineService Co. v. Wilderness Society.51Private litigants had
successfully sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the Secretary
of the Interior, on the grounds that he intended to issue permits to
Alyeska Pipeline Service Company in violation of the Mineral Leasing
Act of 1920.52 Alyeska Pipeline had become a party to the suit as well by
intervention.5 3 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, which
had ruled for the plaintiffs on the merits in the appeal from the District
Court, 54 also awarded attorneys' fees to the plaintiffs under the "private
55
attorney general" theory.

46. Awards, supranote 27, at 284-85. See, e.g., Souza v. Travisono, 512 F.2d 1137, 1138-39
(Ist Cir.), vacated, 423 U.S. 809 (1975); Taylor v. Perini, 503 F.2d 899, 905 (6th Cir. 1974), vacated,
421 U.S. 982 (1975); Fowler v. Schwarzwalder, 498 F.2d 143, 145-46 (8th Cir. 1974).
47. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 245 (1975) (quoting
Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 495 F.2d 1026, 1032 (D.C. Cir. 1974)).
48. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Socy, 421 U.S. 240,245 (1975).
49. See, e.g., Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp. 444 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1971); Sims v. Amos,
340 F. Supp. 691 (M.D. Ala. 1972); La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 337 F. Supp. 221 (N.D. Cal. 1971). For
discussion of these and other cases applying the private attorney general theory, see Note, Awarding
Attorneys'Feesto the "PrivateAttorney General"JudicialGreen Light to PrivateLitigation in the
Public Interest, 24 HAST. L.J. 733 (1973). Cf., Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400
(1968) (attorneys' fees provision of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is intended to encourage
individuals to act as private attorneys general by seeking judicial relief of injunctions to enforce
important public rights).
50. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240,245 (1975).
51. 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
52. Id. at 241-44. The plaintiff's suit was initially brought in federal District Court under the
Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 and the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969. Id at 243.
53. Id. at 243.
54. Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 495 F.2d 1026 (D.C. Cir. 1974). The District Court had
granted a preliminary injunction against issuance of a right of way and permits, but thereafter decided
to dissolve the preliminary injunction, to deny the permanent injunction, and to dismiss the
complaint. 325 F. Supp. 422 (D. D.C. 1970). 421 U.S. at 243-44.
55. 495.2d at 1036.
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The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' fee award, narrowly interpreting the federal courts' equitable power to fashion excep-

tions to the American Rule. Finding that neither the common law bad
faith nor common fund exception permitted a fee award in this case, 56 the
Court held that the Circuit Court could not award attorneys' fees absent
explicit statutory authorization for such an award. 57 Thus, the Supreme
Court left intact the power to award fees under the pre-existing common
law exceptions, which the Court viewed as "unquestionable assertions of
inherent power" in the courts to allow attorneys' fees in particular
situations.5 8 Apart from these exceptions, however, the federal courts did not
possess "any roving authority ... to allow counsel fees as costs or otherwise whenever the courts might deem them warranted."5 9 To the contrary,
the Court held that Congress alone had the power to provide for statutory
exceptions to the American Rule.60 Thus, Congress, not the courts, must
decide which statutory policies are important enough to warrant attor6
neys' fees in order to encourage private litigation. '
Alyeska Pipeline,therefore, limited federal courts to awarding attorneys' fees under the bad faith or common fund exceptions to the Ameri56. The Court noted that the Circuit Court of Appeals had concluded that the parties' position
"'was manifestly reasonable and assumed in good faith ... .'" 421 U.S. at 245 (quoting 495 F.2d at
1029, and that "[a]pplication of the'common benefit'exception... would 'stretch it totally outside its
') Id.
basic rationale ....
57. 421 U.S. at 262-63.
58. Id. at 259. The Court discussed the origins of the American Rule, noting that it had
consistently followed the rule against fee shifting. Id. at 249-50.
59. Id. at 260.
60. Id. at 262. In addition to using the American Rule as a basis for its decision, the Court cited
the general statutory rule that allowances for counsel fees are limited to the sums specified by the costs
statute. Id. at 255.
61. Id. at 262, 269. The Court cited statutes which make "specific and explicit provisions for
the allowance of attorneys' fees." Id. at 260.
Justice Marshall vigorously dissented from the majority decision. Marshall cited the Court's
precedents interpreting the bad faith and common fund exceptions as establishing the federal courts'
broad independent equitable power to award attorneys' fees "when the interests ofjustice so require."
Id at 272-75. In particular, Marshall traced the evolution and expansion of the common fund
exception to include the common benefit exception. Id. at 274-78. Specifically, Marshall described
the case of Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1 (1973), to illustrate this expansion. In that case, the Supreme
Court affirmed the authority of the federal court to grant attorneys' fees to the plaintiff union member
whose litigation against the union "had conferred a substantial benefit on all the members of the
union by vindicating their free speech interests." Id. at 272. The union member sued the union under
the "free speech" provisions of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, which
contained no explicit reference to awards of attorneys' fees. Thus, viewing the Court's prior
interpretations of the federal courts' equitable powers, Marshall rejected the distinction made by the
majority between the common law exception permitted in Hall v. Cole, and the newly created
Alyeska Pipeline requirement of explicit statutory authority for attorneys' fees awards. 421 U.S. at
277-78. Marshall found the statutory silence concerning the attorneys' fees to be an improper basis
for disallowing the federal courts' equitable authority to grant fees "as soon as the far from bright line
between common benefit and public benefit is crossed." Id. at 277-78.
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can Rule or under specific statutory authority. Congress has authorized
fee shifting in many statutes, particularly in civil rights litigation.62 In fact,
following Alyeska Pipeline, Congress reacted promptly by enacting the
Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, under which a federal
court may award attorneys' fees to the prevailing party litigating under
various civil rights statutes.63 As noted by the Alyeska Court, Congress
has based the fee shifting legislation on the "private attorney general"
concept to encourage private enforcement of the public policy expressed
in the substantive provisions of the statute.64
Judicial interpretation of various fee shifting statutes has resulted in
different treatment of prevailing plaintiffs as opposed to prevailing
defendants. In Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc.,65 the United
States Supreme Court interpreted congressional intent underlying the
attorneys' fees provision of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,66
62. See, e.g., Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. §552(a) (4) (E) (1976); the Privacy Act of
1974, 5 U.S.C. §552a(g) (3) (B); the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, 15
U.S.C. §§15c(a) (2), 15c(d) (2), 26 (1976); the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §1640(a) (3); the
Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1975,42 U.S.C. §19731(e); fee provisions in Titles II and VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§2000a-3(b), e-5(k); Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of
1968,42 U.S.C. §3612(c); the Age Discrimination Act of 1975,42 U.S.C.A. §6104(e) (1) (West Cum.
Supp. 1979). See generally Derfner, The True "American Rule:" Drafting Fee Legislation in the
PublicInterest,2 W. NEw ENG. L. REV. 251,251-52 and n.5 (1979); Awards,supra note 27, at 286-87
and n.34.
63. 42 U.S.C. §1988; See LEGAL SERVICES MANUAL, supra note 29, at 1/2; Awards, supranote
27, at 288.
64. 421 U.S. at 263; See also Derfner, supra note 62, at 241. One writer has stated that the
legislative histories of the fee shifting statutes show common congressional goals of encouraging
private enforcement of public policy by litigants of modest means; of deterring unlawful conduct
which might occur by parties who would feel insulated from lawsuits were there no provisions for fee
awards to a prevailing plaintiff; and of generally deterring conduct against statutory policies. Awards,
supranote 27, at n.34.
In the area of labor relations, Congress has explicitly provided for fee shifting in litigation under
certain statutes. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5(k) (1976)
(prohibiting discrimination in employment and authorizing attorneys' fees awards to the prevailing
party, other than the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission or the United States); Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,29 U.S.C. §§621-624 (1976); Fair Labor Standards Act,
29 U.S.C. §216(b) (1970), as amended (Supp. IV 1974) (attorneys' fees awards are mandatory to
prevailing parties who have brought private actions to enforce the minimum wage and overtime
provisions. The fee award under this provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act applies only to
private actions and not to suits brought pursuant to Section 17 by the Secretary of Labor, based on
the view that the private attorney general theory is inapplicable to suits by and at the expense of the
public agency. Edwards, Labor Relations andAttorneys' Fees,54 N.C.L. REV. 1161, 1164 and n.14
(1976)); Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §153(p) (1970) (attorneys' fees are mandatory to a party who
prevails in enforcing an order of the National Railroad Adjustment Board); Labor Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C. §§431(c) and 501(b) (1970) (federal court has discretion to
award attorneys' fees against a defendant labor organization for violation of the inspection of records
and fiduciary duties provisions). See Edwards, at 1161, n.4.
65. 390 U.S. 400 (1968).
66. 42 U.S.C. §§2000a-3(a), 3(b).
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which prohibits discrimination in public accommodations on the basis of
race, color, religion or national origin. 67 Because enforcement of the public rights created by Title II relies in part on private litigation resulting in
an award of an injunction instead of damages, the Court held that a
prevailing plaintiff under Title II is entitled to attorneys' fees unless special
circumstances would render such an award unjust. 69 Thus, the Court
virtually eliminated the discretion of the courts in awarding attorneys' fees
to prevailing plaintiffs under Title II. Thereafter, the Supreme Court
found the PiggieParkstandard of awarding attorneys' fees to the prevailing plaintiff equally applicable to the fee shifting provisions of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.70
Though the attorneys' fees provision of Title VII states that fees may
be awarded to "the prevailing party," a far more stringent standard is
applied to prevailing defendants. In Christiansburg Garment Co. v.
EEOC,71 the Supreme Court held that a prevailing defendant in a Title VII
case may be awarded attorneys' fees only by proving that the plaintiffs
action was "frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though
not brought in subjective bad faith." 72 The Court justified the different
standards by citing the same "equitable considerations" 3 underlying the
"private attorney general" theory; that the plaintiff is "the chosen instrument of Congress to vindicate" important public policies, and the related
fact that attorneys' fees are not only awarded to the prevailing plaintiff,
but also against a violator of federal law. 74
FEE SHIFTING UNDER SECTION 1O(C) OF THE NLRA

Section 10(c) of the NLRA states that if the Board finds that a
respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices, the Board "shall issue
and cause to be served on such person an order requiring such person to
cease and desist from such unfair labor practice, and to take such affirma67. The plaintiffs had brought a class action to enjoin racial discrimination at several
restaurants in South Carolina. 390 U.S. at 400.
68. Id. at 401-02. The Court noted that the Attorney General may intervene in privately
initiated Title II suits "of general public importance," and may independently institute a civil action
only where there is a"pattern of practice" of discrimination. 42 U.S.C. §§2000a-3(a), a-5. 390 U.S. at
n.2.
69. 390 U.S. at 403.
70. Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
71. 434 U.S. 412 (1978).
72. Id. at 421. The standard adopted by the Court, therefore, is somewhat less stringent than
the common law bad faith exception, which would permit attorneys' fees even without the statutory
authorization. Id. at 421-22; See Awards, supra note 27, at 302.
73.

434 U.S. at 419.

74. Id. The ChristiansburgGarment standard also has been applied to attorneys' fees awards
to prevailing defendants under the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Awards Act of 1976,42 U.S.C. §1988,
and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §78(e) (1976). See Awards, supra note 27, at
302-03 and nn. 91-92.
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tive action including reinstatement of employees with or without back
pay, as will effectuate the policies of this Act."75 Thus, the congressional
statement of the Board's remedial power does not specify remedies other
than cease and desist orders, reinstatement, and back pay. There is no
mention of the well accepted remedy of bargaining orders, nor of the
more unusual remedy of attorneys' fees. In terms of the American Rule
against fee shifting, this statutory statement of remedies immediately
brings to mind the Supreme Court decision of Alyeska Pipeline and its
holding that federal courts may not engage in fee shifting absent the
authority found in a common law exception or in statutory allowance of
attorneys' fees. After Alyeska Pipeline, the question must be resolved
whether the National Labor Relations Board, as a federal administrative
agency, is empowered to award attorneys' fees under any circumstances.
If the Board does have this power, the inquiry moves to the question of
the conditions under which the Board may award attorneys' fees; that is,
whether the Board is limited to awarding fees against a party acting in
bad faith, or whether the Board may go beyond this common law exception absent further statutory authorization.
The interpretation and application of the American Rule and its
exceptions in the federal courts are, of course, relevant to the resolution of
the issues concerning fee shifting under Section 10(c). To fully explore the
question of attorneys' fees awards by the NLRB, however, the general law
of fee shifting must be juxtaposed with interpretations of remedial authority unique to the Board, including the scope of the Board's remedial
power and the policies underlying the parameters of that authority. This
juxtaposition will reveal the tensions between the American Rule and the
policies underlying the remedial powers of the Board, and will provide a
perspective from which to identify the effect of the American Rule on the
Board's power to award attorneys' fees.
GeneralRemedial Policies
Any study of the implementation of Section 10(c) and the scope of
the Board's power to remedy the effects of unfair labor practices must be
made against the broader background of the Board's recurring problem
of formulating truly effective remedies. 76 For example, the usual remedies
for the discharge of an employee in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the
NLRA are an order of reinstatement and back pay, a cease and desist
order, and the posting of a remedial notice at the employer's place of
75. 29 U.S.C. §160(c).
76. See Note, NLRB Attorneys' Fees Awards: An Inadequate Remedy for Refusals to
Bargain,63 GEORGETOWN L.J. 955 (1975) [hereinafter referred to as Attorneys' Fees]; Note, NLRB
Powerto Award Damagesin Unfair LaborPractice Cases,84 HARV. L.REv. 1670 (1971) [hereinafter
referred to as NLRB Power].
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business. 77 The usual remedy for an employer's refusal to bargain in
violation of Section 8(a)(5) is an order to bargain in good faith.78 Each of
these commonly ordered remedial actions, however, suffers from the
problem of delay inherent in the administrative and judicial processes
under the NLRA. 79 In any case where a respondent is found to have
committed an unfair labor practice and is therefore ordered to take some

remedial measures, there is a delay of years between the initial order and
its enforcement, if the respondent chooses to take advantage of the full
appellate route. 80 The time span from the administrative law judge's
(ALJ) recommendation of a remedy to the review of such recommendation by the Board. to the enforcement of the Board order by a Circuit
82
Court of Appeals81 causes the remedial effect of the order to dissipate.
The problem of the lack of effectiveness of Board remedies because of the
delay in enforcing the remedy is most prevalent in employer unfair labor

practices83 aimed at avoiding initial unionization, and after unionization,

77. See, e.g., National Steel Prods., 252 N.L.R.B. 833, 105 L.R.R.M. 1606 (1980); Thurston
Motor Lines, Inc., 237 N.L.R.B. 498,99 L.R.R.M. 1477 (1978); Edgewood Nursing Center, Inc., 230
N.L.R.B. 1021, 95 L.R.R.M. 1505 (1977), enforced in part,581 F.2d 363 (3d Cir. 1978).
78.
See, e.g., Jax Mold & Machine, Inc., 255 N.L.R.B. 942, 107 L.R.R.M. 1197 (1981),
enforced, 683 F.2d 418 (11th Cir. 1982); Whittlesea Checker Taxi, Inc., 237 N.L.R.B. 1038, 99
L.R.R.M. 1080 (1978); Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 96 NLRB 850,29 L.R.R.M. 2586 (1951), enforced
205 F.2d 131 (Ist Cir. 1953), cert. denied,346 U.S. 887 (1953).
79. See NLRB Power, supranote 76, at 1671-74.
80. Id..
81. In fiscal year 1981, from the filing of the charge to the completion of the hearing before an
administrative law judge, a median of 217 days elapsed. From the close of the hearing to issuance of
the AL's recommended order, a median of another 139 days elapsed. From the date of the AIJ
decision to issuance of a Board order, a median of another 120 days elapsed. 46 NLRB Ann. Rep. 228
(1981). Further, in fiscal year 1981 if the respondent refused to comply with a Board order, forcing the
Board to seek enforcement in a Circuit Court of Appeals, a median of another 111 days was added to
the process between the time of the issuance of the Board decision and the filing of a petition in the
Court of Appeals. Between the time the petition was filed and the issuance of the Court's opinion, a
median of another 390 days elapsed. (Telephone conversation with a member of the Statistical
Service Staff, NLRB Office of Division of Administration, (Oct. 31, 1983)). It should be noted that
the "median," as a statistical measure, is, unlike "average," insensitive to the actual size of the larger
numbers.
82. NLRB Power, supra note 76, at 1673-74; Murphy, DiscriminatoryDismissal of Union
Adherents During OrganizingCampaigns:Suggested RemedialAmendments, 4 INDUS. REL L.J. 61,
70-73 (1980); Note, NLRB Remedies-Moving into the Jet Age, 27 BAYLOR L. REv. 293, 294 (1975)
[hereinafter referred to as Jet Age].
83. The discussions in this article regarding remedial problems under the NLRA, as well as the
critique of the application of the EAJA to NLRB proceedings will be restricted to employer unfair
labor practices. This restriction is based, in part, on the fact that the vast majority of complaints are
issued against employers. In fiscal year 1981, 83.5% of the 5,711 complaints issued were against
employers; 14.7% were issued against unions, and 1.8% of the complaints were issued against both
employers and unions. 46 NLRB Ann. Rep. 228 (1981). Further, the restriction of remedial problems
of the NLRA to employer unfair labor practices is based on the fact that employers often directly
benefit from delays in litigation of unfair labor practices, while unions do not. On a purely theoretical
level, the expense of litigation as compared with the Board's less costly nonpunitive monetary and
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avoiding a first contract with the union.8 4 The discharge of union activists
during the organizational campaign and the use of dilatory tactics during
bargaining will not be remedied for a period of four or five years. 85
During that time the effects of the discharge, threats, or bad faith bargain-

ing tactics may have their desired effects on the employees, either intimidating them to vote against unionization at all, or encouraging them to
decertify the union during the extended period of bargaining which has
failed to yield a contract. 86 Further, the limited and rarely exercised
injunctive power of the Board helps employers take advantage of the
delay throughout the process. 87 Thus, an employer guilty of violating
either Sections 8(a)(3) or 8(a)(5), used as examples above, may have
actually achieved the purposes behind its unlawful conduct by exploiting
the delay factor built into the system.
nonmonetary remedial orders should compel both unions and employers to avoid increasing their
litigation expenses through delay. Such a balancing test, however, views the Board processes in a
vacuum. The most significant costs to be balanced are those involving the collective bargaining
process itself. For the employer, the long term financial benefits of avoiding entering into a collective
bargaining agreement with a union may far outweigh the specific costs of litigation. In contrast, such
delays will only hurt the union whose collective bargaining strength is dissipated by the delay in
reaching a contract. Further, the union will not reap a corresponding benefit through delay in
litigating union unfair labor practices. See infra notes 84-87 and accompanying text.
The benefits for an employer growing out of the delay in litigating unfair labor practices is also
critical to the discussion of the problems inherent in the application of the EAJA to the NLRB.
Specifically, the existence of these benefits from litigation delay may be viewed as incentives to
litigation, without the need for further incentives provided by the EAJA, See infra notes 334-44,
397-405 and accompanying text. Thus, the critique of the EAJA will, to this extent, be restricted to
the litigation of employer unfair labor practices.
84. NLRB Power, supranote 76, at 1674-76; Murphy, supranote 82, at 72-73; Jet Age, supra
note 82, at 294; See generally, Labor Reform Act of 1977, Hearings on H.R. 8410 Before the
Subcomm. on Labor-ManagementRelations of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 95th
Cong., Ist Sess. (1978) [hereinafter cited as Labor Law Reform].
85. NLRB Power,supra note 76, at 1674-76. Another method of using the delay inherent in
the system to an employer's advantage is by raising an objection to the scope or composition of a
bargaining unit following certification of that unit by the Board. In order to obtain judicial review of
this objection, the employer must refuse to bargain with the union, thereby committing a "technical
violation" of Section 8(a) (5). In such cases, the Board generally grants the General Counsel's motion
for summary judgment, finding that the employer has unlawfully refused to bargain. The Board then
seeks enforcement of its order in the Circuit Court of Appeals, which reviews the employer's unit
objections. See Linden Lumber Div., Summer & Co. v. NLRB, 419 U.S. 817 (1974); Attorneys'ees,
supra note 76, at 962.
86. NLRB Power,supranote 76, at 1673-76. There is also evidence that the delay in reaching a
contract decreases the chances that the parties will ever enter into a contract at all. NLRB Power,
supra note 76, at 1675 (citing P. Ross, THE LABOR LAW IN AcTION-AN ANALYSIS OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS UNDER THE TAFT-HARTLEY Act 6, 12 (1966)). See also Ex-Cell-O Corp.,
185 N.L.R.B. 107, 74 L.R.R.M. 1740 (1970).
87. Though Section 10(j) gives the Board discretion to petition for an injunction after issuing a
complaint alleging commission of an unfair labor practice, the Board rarely exercises this authority.
29 U.S.C. §1600); NLRB Power,supra note 76, at 1671 n.12. By contrast, under Section 10(l), the
Board is required to petition in federal district court for an injunction after issuing a complaint alleging
a violation of section 8(b)(4)(A), (B), or (C), or Section 8(e) or Section 8(b)(7). 29 U.S.C. §160(l).
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The problem of delay is exacerbated by statutorily and judicially

imposed limitations on the Board's remedial power. One such restriction
is the prohibition against punitive measures to remedy the effects of unfair
labor practices. 88 This rule is an outgrowth of the theory that employees
should be "made whole" by the remedy, or returned to the "status quo."'89
These "make-whole" remedies, however, have been widely criticized as
being ineffective. 90 For instance, an order to bargain in good faith provides no incentive to the recalcitrant employer to comply.9t In other cases,

eventual compliance with an order of reinstatement with back pay may be
viewed as the least expensive course from a cost-benefit analysis by an

employer who wishes to discourage employees from unionizing, particu92

larly since the back pay is mitigated by an employee's interim earnings.
The prohibition against punitive orders is a judicially created doctrine.93 Though this restriction on Board authority appears in neither the
NLRA nor its legislative history,94 the United States Supreme Court has
held that Congress intended the NLRA to have purely a remedial pur-

pose; that the "language [of Section 10(c)] should be construed in harmony with the spirit and remedial purposes of the Act." 95 The Court also
found that the deterrent effect of a punitive measure would not place it
within the scope of Section 10(c); nor would a Board determination that
the punitive order would effectuate the policies of the NLRA legitimize
the order.96 To be remedial, an order must be "related to the proven
97
unlawful conduct.

88. See, e.g., Carpenters Local 60 v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 651 (1961); Republic Steel Corp. v.
NLRB, 311 U.S. 7 (1940); Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197 (1938); NLRB Power,
supranote 76, at 1679-83.
89. Phelps Dodge Co. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 194, 197-98 (1940); Murphy, supranote 82, at
63.
90. See, e.g., St. Antoine, A TouchstoneforLabor Board Remedies, 14 WAYNE L. REv. 1039,
1040 (1968); Attorneys'Fees,supra note 76, at n.7; NLRB Power,supra note 76, at 1674, 1679-83;
Labor Law Reform, supranote 84.
91. The Board has stated: "... . [W]e are not unmindful of the consequences that existing
remedial limitations visit upon the Board's capacity meaningfully to remedy unlawful refusals to
bargain in particular... '[a] mere affirmative order [to bargain] does not eradicate the effects of an
unlawful delay... in the fulfillment of a statutory bargaining obligation.' "Wellman Indus., Inc., 248
N.L.R.B. 325,326 n.8, 103 L.R.R.M. 1483, 1485 n.8 (1980) (quoting Ex-Cell-O Corp., 185 N.L.R.B.
107, 108, 74 L.R.R.M. 1740, 1741 (1970)).
92. See NLRB Power,supranote 76, at 1674-76, 1679-83.
93. Attorneys'Fees,supranote 76, at 958 n.17; NLRB Power,supra note 76, at 1679-80.
94. Id
95. Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7, 1(1940).
96. Id. at 12. Regarding the deterrent effect of Board orders, the Court stated, "That argument
proves too much, for if such a deterrent effect is sufficient to sustain an order of the Board, it would
be free to set up any system of penalties which it would deem adequate to that end." Id.
97. NLRB v. Express Publishing Co.,. 312 U.S. 426,433 (1941), quoted in St. Antoine, supra
note 90, at 1040. For examples of Supreme Court decisions invalidating Board orders as punitive, see
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Another limitation on the Board's remedial power is the axiom that
remedies may not be overly speculative. 98 This restriction led the Board to
refuse to award damages as a "make-whole" remedy where an employer
has unlawfully refused to bargain. 99 This proposed damage remedy was
rejected by the Board on another ground as well, representing an addi-

tional restriction on the Board's remedial power; that is, under Section
8(d)100 the Board may not compel the parties to agree to contract terms or
concessions in bargaining.10 This prohibition was applied by the Supreme
Court in United Steelworkers v. NLRB (H.K Porter Co.)10 2 to strike
down a Board order that an employer agree to a checkoff clause to
remedy the employer's unlawful refusal to enter into such a contract
1 03
clause.

The limitations on the Board's powers under Section 10(c) represent
a conservative approach to the authority of the Board to order remedies
which will effectuate the policies of the NLRA. This approach coexists
and is in tension with other interpretations of the grant of authority under
Section 10(c) as being broad, flexible and open to creatively formulated
remedies. This more liberal view of the Board's remedial power flows
Consolidated Edison v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197 (1938) (Board order invalidating contracts between a
labor organization and an employer); Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7 (1940) (Board order
that an employer deduct from back pay to employees the amounts they had received for work
performed on "work relief projects" prior to the employees' reinstatement and to pay such amounts to
the appropriate governmental agencies); Carpenters Local 60 v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 651 (1961) (Board
order that the respondent, either union or employer, reimburse all employees for all dues and fees
collected under an illegal hiring hall agreement between the employer and the union). See discussion
of CarpentersLocal 60 in St. Antoine, supranote 90, at 1041.
98. St. Antoine, supranote 90, at 1045; Attorneys'Fees,supranote 92, at 957.
99. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 185 N.L.R.B. 107,74 L.R.R.M. 1740 (1970); St. Antoine, supranote 90,
at 1045; Attorneys'Fees, supra note 76, at 957. Note, An Analysis of the NLRB's Objections to a
Make- Whole Remedy in Refusal to BargainCases, 3 RUTGERS-CAMDEN L.J. 272 (1971). The Board
rejected the assertion that it has the authority to award damages to employees to remedy this
violation, based on the amount of increased wages and fringe benefits that the employees would have
received if the employer had bargained in good faith to a contract. Tildee Products, Inc., 194
N.L.R.B. 1234, 1234-36,79 L.R.R.M. 1175, 1176-79 (1972). In International Union of Elec. Workers
v. NLRB (Tiidee I), the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that the
Board did possess the authority under Section 10(c) to order damages on this basis to remedy the
employer's refusal to bargain. 426 F.2d 1243, 1252-53 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 950 (1970).
100. The relevant portion of Section 8(d) states: "For the purposes of this section, to bargain
collectively is the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the
employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith... but such obligation does not
compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession."29 U.S.C. §158(d)
(1964).
101. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 185 N.L.R.B. 107, 109-10,74 L.R.R.M. 1740 (1970). See also NLRB v.
American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 404 (1952). For discussions of the Board's rejection of this
remedy for refusal to bargain violations on the basis of the restriction against compelled contract
concessions, see Attorneys'Fees, supranote 76, at 955-57; NLRB Power, supranote 76, at 1689-93.
102. 397 U.S. 99 (1790).
103. Id.
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from the Board's position as an administrative agency with special expertise in the area of labor relations. In creating the NLRB, Congress
intended to give the Board members the freedom to apply their expertise
in determining how best to effectuate the policies of the NLRA. 10 4 The
ultimate goal of carrying out national labor policy can be achieved, therefore, only by giving the Board the independence and flexibility to formulate creative remedial orders. In the early years after the passage of the
NLRA, the Supreme Court described the unique qualities of the NLRB
in applying national labor policy: "[a]ttainment of a great national policy
through expert administration in collaboration with limited judicial
review must not be confined within narrow canons for equitable relief
deemed suitable by chancellors in ordinary private controversies." 105 The
Supreme Court's characterization of the Board reveals that the responsibility for enforcing public rather than private rights requires the Board to
be afforded far more flexibility in ordering remedies than courts determining only private disputes.
The view that the Board has broad remedial power dictates a liberal
interpretation of the actual language of Section 10(c). Thus, consistent
with the experimental nature of the authority to order affirmative action,
the Supreme Court has interpreted the phrase "including reinstatement of
employees with or without back pay, as will effectuate the policies of this
Act," as illustrative of possible remedies, rather than as a limitation on the
Board's remedial power.106
The division between the restrictions on the Board's authority to
order punitive remedies and the image of a Board with wide ranging
remedial power inevitably results in some inconsistent decisions. In one
case the Supreme Court was faced with a challenge that the Board's
calculation of back pay on a quarterly basis between the date of discharge
and the employer's offer of reinstatement would be a punitive measure. 107
Though there was evidence that this system would be "punitive" in some
cases, the majority of the Court discounted this result, stating:
We prefer to deal with these realities and to avoid entering into the
bog of logomachy, as we are invited to, by debate about what is
"remedial" and what is "punitive." It seems more profitable to stick
closely to the direction of the Act by considering what order does, as
this does, and what order does not bear appropriate relation to the
policies of the Act. 108
104. "In fashioning its remedies... the Board draws on a fund of knowledge and expertise all
its own, and its choice of remedy must therefore be given special respect by reviewing courts." NLRB

v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 612 n.32 (1969), quoted in Shepard v. NLRB, -U.S.-,
S.Ct. 665 (1983).
105. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 188 (1940).
106. Id at 188-94; NLRB Power, supranote 76, at 1684.
107. NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344 (1952).
108. Id at 348.
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In addition to general theories of the meaning of Section 10(c), other
practical guidelines have been suggested for the Board to follow in framing specific orders. One consideration is that remedies should be equitable
in relation to the special facts and circumstances of each case. 09 In particular, it has been suggested that the motivation behind the unlawful
actions be closely examined to determine the most equitable remedy
against that respondent." 0 A related guideline is that remedies should be
created appropriate to the individual case rather than the application of
boilerplate remedies for that category of unfair labor practice."' This
approach envisions the formulation of remedial orders specifically aimed
at effectuating the policies of the NLRA as closely as possible in every
case. 1 2 Finally, the Board has been urged to clearly articulate the basis for
its orders, in order to ensure enforcement of the orders in the Circuit
Courts of Appeals, and to deter the commission of similar unfair labor
practices by other parties, who will be fully apprised of the consequences
3
and the reasons underlying the Board action."
Generally, the NLRB has resisted testing the limits of its remedial
power. For example, the Board rejected an invitation by the Circuit Court
of Appeals of the District of Columbia to exercise the full scope of its
authority under Section 10(c) by awarding damages representing lost
4
wages and benefits caused by an employer's refusal to bargain." It
appears that following its defeat in H.K Porter, the Board has been
hesitant to experiment with novel remedies." 5
Attomeys'Fees Awards by the NLRB
In spite of its exhibited timidity in fashioning creative orders, however, the Board has awarded attorneys' fees in a narrow class of cases.
Again, in this area of unusual remedies, the Circuit Court of the District
of Columbia was instrumental in encouraging the Board to take stronger
109. St. Antoine, supranote 90, at 1056.
110. Attorneys' Fees,supra note 76, at 965; NLRB Power,supra note 76, at 1683.
111. St. Antoine, supra note 90, at 1056-57; Attorneys' Fees, supranote 76, at 965.
112. Id
113. The United States Supreme Court recently reiterated the need for the Board to articulate
the reasoning behind its remedial orders in Shepard v. NLRB: "The administrative process will best
be vindicated by clarity in its exercise .... [I]t will avoid needless litigation and make for effective
and expeditious enforcement of the Board's order to require the Board to disclose the basis of its
order." .. U.S...... 103 S.Ct. at 669 (1983) (quoting Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177,
197 (1941)); see also St. Antoine, supranote 90, at 1057.
114. International Union of Elec. Workers v. NLRB [Tiidee Prods.], 426 F.2d 1243 (D.C. Cir.
1970), cert. denied,400 U.S. 950 (1970); UAW v. NLRB, 76 L.R.R.M. 2753 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Tidee
Prods., Inc., 194 N.L.R.B. 1234,79 L.R.R.M. 1175 (1972); Ex-Cell-O Corp., 185 N.L.R.B. 107,74
LtRR.M. 1740 (1970).
115. The Board has been criticized for its conservative approach toward the development of
remedies, particularly in awarding damages. See Attorneys'Fees,supranote 76; NLRB Power,supra
note 76.
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affirmative action against certain violators of the NLRA. Examination of
the development of the rationale of the Board's policy toward fee shifting
is necessary to resolve the issue of the Board's authority to award attorneys' fees, and to determine the scope of cases in which the Board finds
fee shifting appropriate.
The Board's theoretical approach to fee shifting evolved during the

litigation of unfair labor practice charges in Tiidee Products, Inc. 116 and

Heck's, Inc.117 These cases wound a circuitous route through the administrative and judicial process, which the Board itself described as a "labyrin-

thian history."" 8 In both cases, the employers committed unfair labor

practices, including refusals to bargain, in violation of Section 8(a)(5). 119
Further, in each case, the charging party union requested the Board to
expand its usual order under Section 10(c) to include awards of damages
and litigation and organizational expenses. 120 The Circuit Court and the
Board differed on the scope of the Board's remedial power, with each
tribunal's views determined by its interpretation of the recurring issues
central to the determination of the scope of the Board's remedial author-

ity. In particular, those issues revolve around the questions of the Board's
equitable powers as compared with the federal courts, the role of the
charging party in furthering public as well as private interests in litigation,

and the effectuation of the policies of the NLRA through Board remedial
orders.
In the first Tiidee Products case (Tiidee I), the Board petitioned the
Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia for enforcement of
its order that the employer bargain in good faith.121 In addressing the
union's request for an expanded remedial order, the court was cognizant
116. 174N.L.R.B. 705,70 L.R.R.M. 1346 (1969) [Tidee I], enforced inpart andremandedin
part sub nom. International Union of Elec., Radio and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 426
F.2d 1243 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 950 (1970), supplementaldecision, 194 N.L.R.B.
1234,79 L.R.R.M. 1175 (1972); 176 N.L.R.B. 969,72 L.R.R.M. 1199 (1969) [T7idee 11], enforced in
part and remandedin part sub nom. International Union of Elec., Radio and Machine Workers,
AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 440 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1970), supplemental decision, 196 N.L.R.B. 158, 79
L.R.R.M. 1692 (1972).
117. 172 N.L.R.B. 2231, 68 L.R.R.M. 2636 (1968), enforced in part and remandedin part sub
nom. Food Store Employees Union, Local 347 v. NLRB, 433 F.2d 541 (D.C. Cir. 1970),
supplemental decision, 191 N.L.R.B. 886, 77 L.R.R.M. 1513 (1971), enfd and modified, sub nom.
Food Store Employees, Local 347 v. NLRB, 476 F.2d 546 (D.C. Cir. 1973), rev'd in part and
remanded,417 U.S. 1 (1974), supplementaldecision, 215 N.L.R.B. 765, 88 L.R.R.M. 1049 (1974).
118. 215 N.L.R.B. 765, 765, 88 L.R.R.M. 1049, 1049 (1974). See notes 116 and 117, supra.
119. 29 U.S.C. §§158(a)(5) and (1) (1976); 174N.L.R.B. 705,70 L.R.R.M. 1346 (1969) [Tidee
I]; 176 N.L.R.B. 969, 72 L.R.R.M. 1199 (1969) [Tiidee II]; 172 N.L.R.B. 2231, 69 L.R.R.M. 1177
(1968) [Heck's, Inc.].
120. Id.
121. 174 N.L.R.B. 705, 70 L.R.R.M. 1346 (1969), enforced in part and remandedin partsub
nom. International Union of Elec., Radio and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 426 F.2d 1243
(D.C. Cir. 1970).
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of the systeiic problems in creating effective remedies, particularly in
dealing with "a brazen refusal to bargain," 22 as the court found that
"'[e]nforcement of the obligation to bargain collectively is crucial to the
statutory scheme."' 2 3 The court criticized the Board's narrow order to the
employer to bargain in good faith as encouraging frivolous litigation
resulting in delay caused by and of benefit to the employer. 124 Thus, the
court stressed the "broad command" behind the Board's Section 10(c)
grant of authority as a mandate for devising effective and creative remedies. 125 In particular, the court encouraged the Board, on remand, to
award damages to employees representing benefits which employees
would have received had a contract been reached. 26 Even if the Board
rejected this suggestion, the court urged the application of alternate remedies such as the award of litigation costs to "prevent the employer from
having a free ride during the period of litigation." 27 Realizing that such
language conjured images of penalties, however, the court quoted the
Supreme Court's conclusion that a remedy may properly constitute punishment as well as compensation.2
On remand in Tiidee I, the Board rejected as overly speculative the
invitation to award damages to remedy the refusal to bargain. 129 In order
to avoid the "counter-productive" 30 quality of the bargaining order in this
case, however, the Board ordered alternate remedies, including payment
by the employer of the Board's and the union's litigation costs and
expenses. 131 The Board based the attorneys' fees award on a general
rationale of serving the public interest by keeping the Board's and the
courts' crowded dockets free of frivolous litigation, thereby affording
"speedy access" to these tribunals, and thus effectuating the policies of the
NLRA. 132 Chairman Miller, concurring, emphasized his separate opinion

122. 426 F.2d at 1249.
123. Id., (quoting NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 402 (1952)).
124. Id. at 1249-50.
125. Id. at 1248-49.
126. Id at 1250-53.
127. Id at 1251.
128. Id. at 1250 n.8. The vitality of the "penal" objection is also undercut by the Supreme
Court's decision in NLRB v. J.H. Rutter-Rex Mfg. Co., Inc., 396 U.S. 258, 265 (1969): "But the
Board could properly conclude that backpay is not only punishment for an unfair labor practice, but
is also a remedy designed to restore, so far as possible, the status quo which would have obtained but
for the wrongful act."
129. 194 N.L.R.B. 1234,79 L.R.R.M. 1175 (1972).
130. Id.at 1234-35,79 L.R.R.M. at 1177.
131. In addition to the litigation costs, the Board ordered that the remedial notice be mailed to
each employee's home, that the Union be given access to the employer's bulletin boards during
negotiations, and that the employer furnish the union with a list of employees' names and addresses to
be kept current for one year. Id. at 1235-36,79 L.R.R.M. at 1177-78.
132. Id.at 1236,79 L.R.R.M. at 1179.
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33
of the nature of the public interest served by the attorneys' fees award.1
In Miller's view, the union protected the public interest by filing and
litigating unfair labor practice charges, as the enforcement of the NLRA
depends solely on the initiation of charges by private parties. 134
In the second Tiidee Productscase (Tiidee II), the Board, on remand
from the Circuit Court of Appeals, expanded its order to include attorneys' fees to the Board and the union, based on the employer's unfair
labor practices which were "part of the same pattern of patently frivolous
litigation" begun in Tiidee 1.135 The Board, however, expanded its rationale for the purpose of the award as remedying the direct effects of the
36
unlawful conduct which had imposed increased costs on the parties.
Further, the Board found that the fee shifting would deter future similar
37
violations.
Concurrent with the litigation of Tiidee I and II, Heck's, Inc. was
winding its way through the appellate route. The Board's opinions in
Heck's highlight the importance of the perception of the nature of the
charging party's role in determining whether attorneys' fees will be
awarded. While finding that the employer's repeated unfair labor practices were "clearly aggravated and pervasive," 38 the Board denied the
union's request for attorneys' fees, based on the role of the charging party
in light of the familiar principles that the Board may not impose punitive
orders or compensate for collateral losses. 3 9 Unlike Tiidee Products, in
Heck's the Board found that the public interest would not be served by fee
shifting, based on its view that the union's part in protecting the public
interest by initiating and following through the litigation is "incidental to
its efforts to protect its own private interests." 14°
Again, the Circuit Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia
adopted a broader view of appropriate remedies than the Board itself.
The court enlarged the Board order to include attorneys' fees to the Board

133. Id. at 1237-38,79 L.R.R.M. at 1179-80.
134. Id.
135. 196 N.L.R.B. 158, 158, 79 L.R.R.M. at 1692, 1693 (1972) (supp. decision).
136. Id. at 159, 79 L.R.R.M. at 1693.
137. Id.
138. 191 N.L.R.B. 886, 886,77 L.R.R.M. 1513, 1517 (1971) (supp. decision).
139. Id. at 889,77 L.R.R.M. at 1517.
140. Id The Board acknowledged that "the statutory scheme involves an interblending of public
and private interests, and [that] the participation of a charging party can serve a public as well as its
own private interests," citing the Supreme Court's case of United Auto Workers Local 283 v.
Scofield, 382 U.S. 205, 212 (1965). However, the Board viewed the NLRB as fulfilling the "primary
responsibility" for protecting the public interest in labor disputes. 191 N.L.R.B. at 889, 77 L.R.R.M.
at 1517. The Board contrasted Board processes with litigation expenses award under Title 11of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, which it viewed as placing "greater reliance on private action for the
vindication of public rights." id. at 889 n.4, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1517 (citing Newman v. Piggie Park
Enters., 390 U.S. 400 (1968)).
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and the union, finding that the Board had changed its policy toward fee
shifting when it awarded fees in Tiidee I.14 1 The court refused to take a
mechanistic approach to the issue of fee shifting. Therefore, the court did
not find significant the failure of the Board to describe the employer's
defenses as "frivolous;" the Board's characterization of the misconduct as
"clearly aggravated and pervasive" supported an attorneys' fees award 142
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari on the issue of
the Court of Appeals' enlargement of the Board order and held that the
court should have remanded the case to the Board for the "opportunity to
clarify the inconsistencies" between Tiidee Productsand Heck '.143 Figuring prominently in the Court's opinion was the Court of Appeals' failure
to reconcile the Board's reliance on its view of the subsidiary role of the
charging party in litigation as justifying the denial of attorneys' fees under
the circumstances of the case. 44 The Court foreshadowed the Board's
opinion on remand by speculating that the Board might find that the
public interest in clear dockets is served by awarding attorneys' fees where
the employer litigates frivolous defenses, but not where the employer's
defenses are debatable. 45
Significantly, the Court specifically reserved the underlying question
of the Board's power to award litigation and organizational expenses
under Section 10(c). 146 The Court's opinion relied instead on the misuse of
the lower court's appellate review power. 47 Therefore, the Court did not
express approval or disapproval of any potential theory for fee shifting.
On remand, the Board followed the Supreme Court's proposed distinction between frivolous and debatable defenses to harmonize Heck's
4
and 7idee Products.1
8 Thus, attorneys' fees would not be awarded where
an employer raised debatable defenses, even though the employer committed "clearly aggravated and pervasive misconduct." 149 The Board's
opinion is, however, noticeably lacking in guidance as to the meaning of
frivolous and debatable defenses. The Board also clearly left the door
open for expansion and modification of its theory, stating that it did not
141. Food Store Employee's Union, Local No. 347 v NLRB, 476 F.2d 546, 551, cert. denied,
414 U.S. 1069 (1973), reh'g denied, 415 U.S. 961 (1974).
142. Id. at 551. The court stated: "It would appear that the Board has now recognized that
employers who follow a pattern of resisting union organization and who to that end unduly burden
the processes of the Board and the courts, should be obliged, at the very least, to respond in terms of
making good the legal expenses to which they have put the charging party and the board." Id.
143. NLRB v Food Store Employees Union, Local 347,417 U.S. 1, 9 (1974).
144. Id. at 8-9
145. Id.
146. Id at 8, n. 9.
147. Id at 8.
148. 215 N.L.R.B. 765,767, 88 L.R.R.M. 1049, 1051-52 (1974) (supp. decision).
149. Id. at 767, 88 L.R.R.M. at 1052.
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"intend to lock in concrete any past precedent, nor to appear to make this
Decision the authoritative expansion of future remedial policy." 5 0

The distinction between frivolous and debatable defenses has remained the basis for the Board's decision regarding attorneys' fees

awards, though With little more illumination as to the meaning of this
characterization of the employer's litigation posture.' 5' The question per-

sists, however, whether the Board may exercise its remedial power to
award attorneys' fees. In fact, this issue was recently revived following the
Supreme Court decision of Summit Valley Industries, Inc.,15 2 where the

Court held that federal courts may not award attorneys' fees to employers
under Section 303 of the Labor Management Relations Act,153 for reimbursement of fees incurred by the employer in prior unfair labor practice
pioceedings before the Board. 54 The Court applied Alyeska Pipeline's
interpretation of the American Rule to find that Congress did not intend
the term "damages" in Section 303 to include attorneys' fees.155
tF911owing Summit Valley, the issue of Board authority to award

attorneys' fees was resurrected in the litigation involving a recent Board
award of litigation and organizational expenses against J.P. Stevens &
Co., Inc. at its Wallace, North Carolina facility. 5 6 Following the Fourth
Circuit's enforcement of the Board order which included these expenses, 57
the Supreme Court granted certiorari on the fees issue.158 The Court did
not address the issue, though, vacating the judgment below and remanding the case for further consideration in light of Summit Valley. 59 In
150. Id. at 768, 88 L.R.R.M. at 1052.
151. See e.g., Southern Newspapers, Inc., diblal The Bayton Sun, 255 N.L.R.B. 154,154 n.2,
107 L.R.R.M. 1058 (1981); Upper Mississippi Towing Corp. and its [Alleged] Alter Egos,
C & G Operating Co. Inc.; River City Towing Corp.; Ole Man River, Inc.; and Jemco
Towing, Inc., 246 N.L.R.B. 262, 264, n.12, 102 L.R.R.M. 1536 (1979); Fort Vancouver Plywood
Co., 235 N.L.R.B. 635, 635 n.3, 98 L.R.R.M. 1405 (1978), modified on other grounds, 604 F.2d
596 (9th Cir. 1979).
152. Summit Valley Indus. v. Local 112, United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners of Am.,
456 U.S. 717 (1982).
153. 29 U.S.C. §187 (1978). Section 303(b) provides, in relevant part: "Whoever shall be
injured hnhis business or property by reason of any violation of Subsection(a) may sue therefor in any
district court of the United States... and shall recover the damages sustained by him and the cost of
the suit."154. 456 U.S. at 725-27. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had enforced the Board's order
based on findings that the union had engaged in unlawful secondary and jurisdictional activity, in
violation of Sections 8(b)(4)(B) and 8(b)(4)(D) of the NLRA. United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners
of Anerica, Local 112 v. NLRB, 574 F.2d 457 (9th Cir. 1978).
155. 456 U.S. at. 721-22. Summit Valley sought damages under Section 303 based on its
business losses resulting from the union activity and attorneys' fees expended during the Board
proceedings156. J.P. Stevens & Co., 244 N.L.R.B. 407,409, 102 L.R.R.M. 1039, 1040 (1979). The Board
found-Stevens in violation of Sections 8(a)(l), (3) and (5).
157. J.P. Stevens & Co., Inc. v. NLRB, 668 F.2d 767 (4th Cir. 1982).
1-58. J.P. Stevens & Co., Inc. v. NLRB, -U.S._
102 S.Ct. 3505 (1982).

159.

Id
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October, 1982, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals remanded the case to
the Board for reconsideration on this question. 60 Following the remand,
in mid-October, 1983, the parties entered into a settlement of all J.P
Stevens litigation, including the issue of attorneys' fees. 161 As the Board
will not have the opportunity to decide the attorneys' fees issue in this
case, the power and scope of the Board's fee shifting power remains an
open question.
When the Board does finally address these questions, thorough resolution of the issues will require integration of the general rules of fee
shifting, Board remedial policies and the underlying themes of Tiidee and
Heck's. In fact, the arguments for and against the existence of Board
power to award attorneys' fees reflect the historic tensions between placing limitations on Board remedial authority and extending a broad area
to the Board for creative and flexible expressions of remedial power.
The arguments against Board fee shifting authority have several
bases. The most basic argument asserts that an administrative agency,
unlike the federal courts, "does not possess inherent equitable power
because it is a creature of the statute that brought it into existence." 62
This approach goes beyond Alyeska, by prohibiting the Board from
awarding fees under any circumstances absent explicit statutory authority, even under the common law exceptions to the American Rule.
A second argument against Board fee shifting power stems from a
literal interpretation of "affirmative action" ordered by the Board under
Section 10(c) as limiting monetary compensation to back pay, thereby
precluding fee awards. 63 This position would emphasize the holding of
Alyeska, reaffirmed by Summit Valley, that Congress must provide
explicitly for fee shifting. Thus, as with the term "damages" in Section
303, the term "affirmative action" would be too general to include attorneys' fees.
Even assuming that the Board possesses equitable power, fee shifting
by the Board has been criticized as violating the maxim against punitive
160. The remand was ordered over J.P. Stevens' opposition. See Petitioner's Response in
Opposition to Respondent's Motion to Remand, J.P. Stevens & Co., Inc. v. NLRB, Case No.
79-1502 (unpublished).
161. J.P. Stevens & Co., 268 N.L.R.B. No. 19 (1983); J.P. Stevens & Co., 268 N.L.R.B. No. 20
(1983); J.P. Stevens & Co., 268 N.L.R.B. No. 21 (1983); J.P. Stevens & Co., 268 N.L.R.B. No. 22
(1983); J.P. Stevens & Co., 268 N.L.R.B. No. 23 (1983); J.P. Stevens & Co., 268 N.L.R.B. No. 24
(1983); J.P. Stevens & Co., 268 N.L.R.B. No. 25 (1983).
162. This view was expressed by Judge MacKinnon as his personal opinion included in the
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals' decision authored by Judge MacKinnon, enforcing the NLRB's
attorneys' fees awards in 7iidee I and Tlidee II. International Union of Elec. Workers, AFL-CIO v.
NLRB, 502 F.2d 349,352-53, n.* (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974).
163. Again, this view was expressed as Judge MacKinnon's personal opinion in 7iidee III:
"Moreover, where monetary compensation is involved, the Congress thought it necessary to state
explicitly that employees could be 'reinstated with or without back pay.' "International Union of
Elec. Workers, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 502 F.2d 349, 353, n.* (D.C. Cir. 1974) (emphasis in original).
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orders. 64 The Supreme Court itself has called attorneys' fees a punitive
measure.1 65 Thus, the "deterrence rationale" of awarding fees against the
violator of the NLRA arguably would place fee shifting outside the scope

of Section 10(c).166
The characterization of the charging party's role in Board litigation
also figures in the debate over the Board's power to award attorneys' fees.

In Tiidee Productsand Heck's, the Board majority assigned a minor role
to the charging party in fulfilling public interests by litigating unfair labor
practice charges. 67 Opponents of fee awards would, therefore, emphasize
the private nature of the charging party's interests to narrow the circumstances allowing for fee shifting.
The arguments in favor of the Board authority to order fee shifting
represent a broad interpretation of Section 10(c), as opposed to emphasizing the limits on Board remedial authority. Supreme Court precedent
repeatedly recognizes the importance of allowing the Board leeway to
create effective remedies without restricting the agency to the "narrow
canons for equitable relief deemed suitable by chancellors in ordinary
private controversies." 168 Thus, this view of the Board's equitable power
would enable it to formulate remedies such as fee shifting, at least within
the common law exceptions to the American Rule. 169 Further, a literal
interpretation of Section 10(c) would be unjustified in light of the
Supreme Court's interpretation of Section 10(c) as providing examples of
70
appropriate remedies, without purporting to provide exclusive remedies.
The response to the characterization of attorneys' fees awards as
punitive must concentrate on the remedial aspect of fee shifting under the
164. Attorneys'Fees, supra note 76, at 957-58. Judge MacKinnon stated the majority opinion
in Tiidee III that fee awards to the union as charging party, were more remedial than punitive, but
separately expressed his personal view that such awards to the NLRB would be impermissibly
punitive. International Union of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 502 F.2d 349, 356-57, n.*** (D.C. Cir.
1974). In 7Tidee III, the majority held that fees were not properly awarded by the Board to itself in
Tlidee I and II, while affirming the Board's power to award fees to itself. Id at 357-58.
165. Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1973) (referring to attorneys'fees awarded under the common
law bad faith exception).
166. See International Union of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 502 F.2d 349, 357 n.*** (D.C. Cir.
1974).
167. See supra text accompanying notes 132-34 and 140.
168. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 188 (1940). See supra text accompanying
notes 104-06.
169. This argument was expressed by the General Counsel and the Union in the litigation of
J.P. Stevens & Co. (Wallace) on remand from the United States Supreme Court for reconsideration
in light of Summit Valley. See Reply of NLRB to Petitioner's Response in Opposition to Motion for
Remand (October 9, 1982); Intervenor's Response to Petitioner's Response in Opposition to
Respondents Motion to Remand (October 14, 1982); Charging Party's Statement of Position
Regarding Reconsideration of the Board of Its Awards of Litigation and Organization Expenses
(November 17, 1982) (all briefs unpublished).
170. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 188-94, See supra text accompanying note
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NLRA. In further JP. Stevens litigation concerning its Roanoke Rapids
facility, the union argued that the fee award was not punitive, highlighting
the Board's description of the award to the union "as remedial and nonpunitive, and a remedy which contemplates the recovery of costs which by
no means should be viewed as collateral."17 1 This approach views fee
awards as a direct remedy for the injury created by the respondent's
frivolous litigation. 172 Even assuming a punitive aspect to fee shifting,
however, the validity of such awards may be supported by Supreme
Court precedent approving Board orders which achieve both a punitive
73
and compensatory purpose. 1
The objection that fees awarded to the Board are punitive is more
problematic, as the equities of returning the charging party to the status
quo ante are absent. 74 Regardless of the punitive nature of the award,
though, the order of fees to the Board is arguably proper; it is consistent
with the Supreme Court's demonstrated willingness to ignore the limitation on punitive damages where an order effectuates important policies.
The role of the charging party in litigation is viewed more broadly by
proponents of fee shifting. This view, expressed by then Chairman Miller
in his concurrence in the Tiidee I remand, emphasizes that the enforcement of national labor policy depends solely on the charging party's
initiation of the administrative process. 17 The charging party's role in
furthering public policies, therefore, analogized to the "private attorney
general," weighs in favor of awarding attorneys' fees to encourage litigation, at least within the common law exceptions.
The public nature of Board litigation is also important in distinguishing Summit Valley. As noted by the General Counsel in J.P. Stevens
171. The union was quoting the AUI's language in J.P. Stevens & Co. (Wallace), 244 N.L.R.B.
407,459, 102 L.R.R.M. 1039, 1040 (1979). See Union's Statement of Position on Remand of Board's
Order Requiring Respondent to Pay Litigation and Negotiation Expenses. Case Nos. I 1-CA-6038 et
al.(March 3, 1981) (unpublished).
172. See Tiidee Prods., Inc. (Tiidee II), 196 N.L.R.B. 158, 159,79 L.R.R.M. 1692, 1693 (1972)
(supp. decision).
173. NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344,348 (1952). See text accompanying notes
107-08. See also Wellman Indus., Inc., 248 N.L.R.B. 325, 326, 103 L.R.R.M. 1483, 1484 (1980)
(deterrent effect of order of litigation and negotiation expenses not as great as the remedial effect of
the order).
174, International Union of Elec. Workers, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 502 F.2d 349, 356-57, 357
n.*** (D.C. Cir. 1974) (MacKinnon, J., separate opinion). The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals
approved the award of attorneys' fees to the Board in Food Store Employees, Local 347 v. NLRB,
476 F.2d 546, 551 (D.C. Cir. 1973), stating that "... . employers who follow a pattern of resisting
union organization, and who to that end unduly burden the processes of the Board and the courts,
should be obliged, at the very least, to respond in terms-of making good the legal expenses to which
they have put the charging parties and the Board." See also J.P. Stevens & Co., 244 NLRB 407,459
(1979): "... it is only reasonable that the general tax paying community be relieved from shouldering
the expenses entailed in protracted litigation at the hand of Stevens' lawlessness."
175. T'idee Prods., Inc., 194 N.L.R.B. 1234, 1237-38,79 L.R.R.M. 1179-80 (1972).
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(Wallace), Summit Valley was concerned only with the federal court's
award under Section 303, which involves purely private litigation. 176 By
contrast, Board orders under Section 10(c) further the public interest,
presenting different circumstances by which to judge the award. 177 Summit Valley may also be distinguished by the plaintiffs attempt to create a
new exception to the American Rule by interpreting "damages" in Section
303 to include attorneys' fees. By contrast, Board awards of attorneys' fees
178
for frivolous defenses fall within the bad faith exception.
In weighing the arguments for and against the Board's authority to
award attorneys' fees, the scales tip in favor of affirming the Board's
power. The Board's position as the expert body in interpreting the NLRA
requires that it be given at least as much leeway as the federal courts to
formulate orders which remedy the effects of unfair labor practices. Given
the public interests furthered by Board orders under Section 10(c), and
the compensatory nature of the fee awards, the deterrent aspect of fee
shifting should not affect its validity. With regard to the specific challenge
based on Summit Valley, the arguments in favor of Board authority
retain their strength, as important distinctions exist between Summit
Valley and fee shifting under Section 10(c).
The holdings of Alyeska Pipeline and Summit Valley will likely
require the Board to order attorneys' fees within the parameters of the
common law exceptions to the American Rule, as Section 10(c) contains
no explicit grant of authority to order fee shifting. This conclusion would
seem irrebuttable, but for a casual statement regarding Board remedies by
the Supreme Court in the recent decision of Bill Johnson's Restaurants,
Inc. v. NLRB. 179 The case arose in the context of the Board's cease and
desist order to halt prosecution of a state court civil suit brought by an
employer against his employees in retaliation for their labor activity. 80
The Court held that the Board may issue a cease and desist order only
where the lawsuit is proven to be without merit, in addition to having
been brought for a retaliatory purpose.18 1In what is arguably dictum, the
176. Reply of National Labor Relations Board to Petitioner's Response in Opposition to
Motion for Remand, Case No. 79-1502 (October 9, 1982), p. 3 (unpublished).
177. Id. See National Licorice Co. v. Labor Bd., 309 U.S. 350,364 (1940): "The Board asserts a
public right vested in it as a public body, charged in the public interest with the duty of preventing
unfair labor practices."
178. Both the union and the General Counsel argued in the J.P. Stevens'Wallace remand that
the attorneys' fees awards fall within the bad faith exception to the American Rule. See supra note
169.
179. __U.S.,
103 S.Ct. 2161 (1983).
180. -U.S.103 S.Ct. at 2165-67. The employees picketed the employer's restaurant
alleging that management was unfair to its waitresses, and distributed a leaflet that accused management of sexual harassment and discrimination against union activists. The employer's state court
complaint contained, inter alia, a libel count. -U.S._.,
103 S.Ct. at 2165.
181.
-U.S.103 S.Ct. at 2171.
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Court stated that if the Board finds that the employer committed an
unfair labor practice by filing the lawsuit, "the Board may order the
employer to reimburse the employees whom he had sued for their attorneys' fees and other expenses.., and order any other proper relief that
would effectuate the policies of the Act." 82 Certainly, this statement provides strong support for the Board's ability to award attorney's fees.
Furthermore, in contrast to the interpretation of Section 303 in Summit
Valley, the Court approved the award under Section 10(c) of prior litigation expenses. Thus, after Bill Johnson's Restaurants,it remains uncertain how far the Board may extend its fee awards. Due to the Court's
total lack of analysis of the fee question, it is unclear whether the Court
intended to limit the approval of the fee award to the facts of the case.
Given the Court's repeated affirmation of Alyeska Pipeline,83 however,
the Board is more likely limited to the restrictions of the common law
exceptions to the American Rule.
Expansion of Fee Shifting Under Section 10(c)
Examination of Board cases where litigation expenses have been
requested shows that the awards which have been granted fall within the
bad faith exception to the American Rule. In fact, Board case law shows
that the Board's standards after Heck's are even more stringent than those
applied by the federal courts in finding bad faith litigation by a party. The
Board's self-imposed strictures, therefore, have resulted in an overly narrow assertion of its fee shifting power. Thus, the Board has room to
expand its attorneys' fees awards within the confines of the common law
bad faith exception.
The bad faith exception to the American Rule permits fee awards to
the prevailing party when the opposing party has acted "in bad faith,
vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons."1 84 Though-an extraordinary remedy, attorneys' fees have been granted in a variety of situations,
including those involving conduct underlying the lawsuit as well as
conduct during the actual litigation. 85 The few cases where the Board has
182. ._U.S.
103 S.Ct. at 2172.
183. See Summit Valley Indus. v. Local 112,456 U.S. 717 (1982); In Re Primus, 436 U.S. 412,
430 n.23 (1978); Ernst & Ernst v. Hockfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 211 n.30 (1976).
184. Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1,5(1973). See, e.g., Red School House, Inc. v. OEO, 386 F. Supp.
1177, 1193-94 (D. Minn. 1974) (fees awarded against defendant OEO where OEO halted funds to
plaintiff schools, in violation of its own regulations and existing statutory directives); Baas v. Elliot, 71
F.R.D. 693, 694 (N.D. Miss. 1976) (fees assessed against defendant which removed state suit to
federal court for the sole purpose of having the federal court dismiss the case for want ofjurisdiction);
Gates v. Collier, 70 F.R.D. 341, 345 (N.D. Miss. 1976) (defense against prison conditions suit was in
bad faith where defendants sought to delay litigation and continued to deny "facts that were well
documented and known."). See also infra note 207.
185. See supra text accompanying notes 34-42.
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awarded litigation expenses clearly are included within the bad faith
exception. For example, in Wellman Industries, Inc.,186 the Board found
that the Respondent's defense to the refusal to bargain charge was "specious and frivolous."1 87 Respondent defended against the charge on the
ground that its employees had not voted on the merger of the Textile
Workers Union and the Amalgamated Clothing Workers, though the
Respondent had caused the employees' ineligibility to vote by its own
unfair labor practices. 188 In Koval Press, Inc.,189 the Board awarded
attorneys' fees, finding that Respondent's defenses to the allegation of a
refusal to bargain were "patently frivolous," and "defle[d] reality." 190 In
that case, the employer refused to bargain based on its challenge to the
appropriateness of the bargaining unit to which the employer had stipulated as appropriate, as well as its denial that the Board had issued a
Certificate of Representative.' 9' On their face, the defenses put forth in
these cases are so totally devoid of merit as to fit easily within the federal
bad faith exception.
There are also cases, however, where the Board has refused to award
attorneys' fees under the stringent frivolous defense standard of Tildee
Products and Heck's, but where a federal court could have awarded fees
under the common law bad faith exception. For example, in The Leavenworth Times, A Division of Thompson Newspapers, Inc.,192 the Board
states, "[w]hile Respondent's conduct was ultimately determined to have
been in bad faith, we do not feel, in the facts presented, that its behavior
was so egregious, nor its defenses so frivolous, that the usual remedies...
will fail to remedy the unfair labor practices found." 193 Board member
Murphy dissented vehemently from the denial of attorneys' fees, noting
her reasons for finding the award essential. 194 Murphy described the
employer's bad faith bargaining as "outrageous," 95 with the employer's
bad faith exemplified by its own admission that it had unilaterally with-

186. 248 N.L.R.B. 325, 103 L.R.R.M. 1483 (1980).
187. Id. at 328, 103 L.R.R.M. at 1486.
188. Id. at 328-29, 103 L.R.R.M. at 1486-87. Due to the employer's "prolonged refusal to
bargain in good faith," the employees were not a chartered local of the Textile Workers' Union, which
was required for eligibility to vote on the merger.
189. 241 N.L.R.B. 1261, 101 L.R.R.M. 1086 (1979), enforced 106 L.R.R.M. 2603 (3d Cir.
1980).
190. Id. at 1263, 101 L.R.R.M. at 1087.
191. Id. The employer also denied that the union received a majority of the employees' votes,
All the defenses were found to be nothing more than frivolous denials of the complaint allegations in
order to delay the commencement of bargaining. Id. at 1263-64, 101 L.R.R.M. at 1086-87.
192. 234 N.L.R.B. 649, 97 L.R.R.M. 1346 (1978).
193. Id. at 649 n.2.
194. Id. at 649-51. Murphy criticized the Board for "abdicat[ing] their responsibility under*
Section 10(c) of the Act" to provide meaningful and creative remedies. Id. at 650-5 1.
195. Id. at 649.
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held wage increases in order to apply economic pressure in bargaining. 196
Further evidence of the employer's bad faith was the fact that its actions
were "not the result of Respondent's innocence or inexperience with the
requirements of Section 8(a)(5) and 8(d) [as] amply demonstrated by the
fact that Respondent has engaged in substantially similar conduct, with
substantially similar consequences, in the relatively recent past."197 In fact,
as Murphy noted, the employer had been represented by the same negotiator in a prior case where it had been found guilty of similar unfair labor
practices. 98 Another case where the Board refused to award fees, overruling the AL's recommendation for the award is StandardHomes, Inc. 99
As in Leavenworth Times, the ALl's recommendation was based in part
on a finding that the employer's actions were not "based on ignorance [of
the NLRA] rather than a design to subvert it;"200 though the employer
had not been adjudicated to have committed similar unfair labor prac20 1
tices, it had been previously involved in litigation before the Board.
This factor was particularly significant in light of the clear nature of the
violations involving repudiation of unambiguous terms of the collective
bargaining agreement. 202 The Board refused to award litigation expenses,
despite the AL's finding of the employer's "willful abrogation of the
collective bargaining agreement, and disregard of the Board's processes." 203
196. Id.at 650. Murphy also found that "indicative of Respondents bad faith was its refusal to
furnish the Union with information regarding its sick leave policy, a subject over which Respondent
also insisted on sole discretion." Id.
197. Id See cases cited, id at 649 n.4.
198. Id. The prior case was Dothan Eagle, Inc., a subsidiary of Thomson Newspapers, 174
N.L.R.B. 804,70 L.R.R.M. 1350 (1969), enforced, 434 F.2d 93 (5th Cir. 1970).
199. 249 N.L.R.B. 1085, 104 L.R.R.M. 1319 (1980).
200. Id at 1088.
201. Id. The AL cited R.L. Sweet Lumber Co., 207 N.L.R.B. 529,85 L.R.R.M. 1073 (1973),
enforced,515 F.2d 785 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,423 U.S. 986 (1975) and R.L. Sweet Lumber Co., 227
N.L.R.B. 1084, 95 L.R.R.M. 1388 (1977), both involving the employer's Standard Homes facility
which was the subject of the instant allegations. Id
202. The ALT found that the undisputed facts did not give rise to any debatable issues, and
that the employer's defenses were frivolous regarding the allegation that the employer repudiated a
specific clause in the dontract by unilaterally withholding a safety shoe allowance to certain
employees, in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and 8(d). Id at 1087-88, 95 L.R.R.M. at 1388.
203. Id at 1085 n.2, 1088. The employer also refused to produce subpoenaed documents, and
admitted that it was simply ignoring the subpoena. Id at 1088. See infra text accompanying notes
230-31. See also Glenside Hosp. 234 N.L.R.B. 62, 62, 70, 97 L.R.R.M. 1091, 1091-92 (1978)
(Board overruled AL's recommendation of attorneys' fees, despite the ALT's characterization of the
unlawful discharge of an employee as respondent's "premeditated misconduct"); Teckwal Corp., 253
N.L.R.B. 187, 187, 194-95, 105 L.R.R.M. 1508, 1508, 1509 (1980) (Board overruled ALT's
recommendation of attorneys' feeswhere the ALT found respondent's conduct in violation of Section
8(a) (5) based on undisputed evidence; Ai found fees appropriate though "Respondent's past
litigation history is not comparable to that attributed to the Respondent in Wellman Industries,
Inc.'); Litton Fin. Printing Div., A Div. of Litton Business Sys., Inc., 256 N.L.R.B. 516, 107
L.R.R.M. 1327 (1981) ("technical violation" by recidivist violator, Respondent refused to bargain
based on allegations of union pre-election misconduct which had been overruled by a hearing officer
and affirmed by the Board; attorneys' fees request denied by the Board with no analysis of Litton's
notoriety as a violator of the NLRA nor the potential misuse of "technical violations" for delay).
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These examples are linked by the common finding that the employer
had engaged in repeated misconduct or that the employer was knowledgeable of the requirements under the NLRA because of prior litigation

before the Board. This factor, combined with the bad faith evidenced by
the overt nature of the unfair labor practices committed, result in circumstances which the Board finds insufficiently frivolous to meet the Heck's
frivolous-debatable standard, but which would be sufficient to meet the
204
bad faith standard of the federal courts.
The common law bad faith standard in cases of repeated misconduct
was applied by the AL to recommend an award of attorneys' fees in the

J.P.Stevens litigation at its Roanoke Rapids facility.205 The AJ found
that Stevens' repeated unfair labor practices "displayed the requisite 'willful and persistent defiance of the law' [which] falls within established
exceptions to the counsel fee rule in American jurisprudence" to warrant
fee shifting.206 The ALJ relied on federal precedent where attorneys' fees

were awarded based on bAtf faith conduct by a litigant which was also
part of a pattern of evasion of legal obligations. 207 This body of law,
combined with the Board's evident willingness in Heck's to leave room for
new standards for fee shifting against the recidivist violator, convinced the
AJ that the fee award was appropriate. 208 Though it adopted the AL's
recommendation, the Board failed to discuss this apparent change of

204. See also Betra Mfg. Co., 233 N.L.R.B. 1126, 1126-28, 97 L.R.R.M. 1005, 1007 (1977)
(Murphy dissented from Board's denial of attorneys' fees for surface bargaining, characterizing
respondent's conduct as a "duplicitous bargaining charade;" Board found that not all defenses were
patently frivolous, and noted that this was respondent's first violation); Crystal Springs Shirt Corp.,
229 N.L.R.B. 4, 4 n.l, 7-8,95 L.R.R.M. 1038,1039 (1977) (Murphy dissented from Board's failure to
order fees; AL concluded that it was "inescapable that Respondent had no intention of reaching an
agreement with the Union." Respondent had been found guilty of unfair labor practices in other
divisions of its company); Eastern Maine Medical Center, 253 N.L.R.B. 224,249, 105 L.R.R.M. 1665
(1980), enforced, 658 F.2d I (1st Cir. 1981) (ALJ refused to recommend fees though employer's
conduct in violation of Section 8(a)(5) "was calculated and deliberate," the employer was represented
during negotiations by counsel who litigated the unfair labor practice charges, and where the AL
concluded that "Respondent's litigation of this case was simply a contirtat on of its bad-faith [sic]
bargaining attitude aimed at defeating the union."). See supranote 184.
205. J.P. Stevens & Co., Inc., 239 N.L.R.B. 738, 769-75, 100 L.RI.M. 1052, 1055 (1978).
Respondent was found in violation of numerous allegations of Section 8(a)(5). Id. at 738, 770, 100
L.RR.M. at 1052, 1053.
206. Id. at 773, 100 L.R.R.M. at 1055.
207. In particular, the ALJ relied on Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527,531 (1962); Brewer v.
School Bd. of the City of Norfolk, Va., 456 F.2d 943, 949 (4th Cir. 1972); Bell v. School Bd. of
Powhatan Co., Va., 321 F.2d 494,500 (4th Cir. 1963); and Rolax, et al. v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R.
Co., et al., 186 F.2d 473,481 (4th Cir. 1951), as relevant in awarding fees where the bad faith conduct
was part of a pattern of misconduct. 239 N.L.R.B. at 772-73. The AL noted that"the Board has not
consciously addressed itself" to the bad faith exception to the American Rule "carved out" by the
federal courts. Id. at 772.
208. Id. at 772-73.
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policy,209 causing the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals to remand the case
for clarification. 2 0 Specifically, because the ALJ did not explicitly find
the defenses to be frivolous, and because Stevens prevailed on some
issues, the court required the Board to articulate any policy change
adopted. 21' In the Fourth Circuit's subsequent review of the J.P.Stevens
Wallace case, however, the court was satisfied with the Board's explanation of a narrow extension of its fee shifting doctrine, to permit fee awards
where the unfair labor practices are "flagrant, aggravated, persistent, and
pervasive."2 1 2 The court also noted that J.P. Stevens might be the only
employer which could meet this new standard. 2 3 Due to the settlement of
the J.P.Stevens litigation, however, the Board will not have the opportunity to harmonize the Wallace and Roanoke Rapids cases, nor to comment on the Circuit Court's opinion.
Thus, the Board has shown some willingness to expand its theory of
fee shifting from the stringent frivolous-debatable standard to a broader
area closer to the federal bad faith exception to the American Rule. It
appears, however, that this extension may be as narrow as the Fourth
Circuit envisioned. The StandardHomes case was decided after the Stevens Wallace case, with the ALJ's recommendation supported by his
finding of the willful and persistent misconduct, as in J.P.Stevens.21 4 In
rejecting this recommendation, however, the Board merely cited its refusal in Heck's "to award litigation costs, even if the respondent has
'engaged in "clearly aggravated and pervasive misconduct" or in the fla15
grant repetition of conduct previously found unlawful.'" 2
Recent Board law indicates that the Board not only views the J.P.
Stevens case as a unique case, but is even using the element of repeated
misconduct to impose further restrictions on fee awards under the Tiidee
Productsfrivolous litigation standard. In October, 1982, the Board over209. Id. at 738-39.
210. J.P. Stevens & Co. v. NLRB, 623 F.2d 322,329-30 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,449 U.S.
1077 (1981).
211. While the AiU had found that the defenses were not debatable, he had not explicitly
characterized them as "frivolous." Id. at 329. Further, the Court was uncertain as to whether the
Board order relied on the ALJ's application of federal precedent concerning the bad faith exception
to the American Rule, and his reliance on the Respondent's recidivism, or whether the Board had
changed its standard of awarding fees on some other basis. Id.
212. 668 F.2d 767, 777 (4th Cir. 1982). The Court also stated incorrectly that the Supreme
Court had specifically approved the Board's frivolous/debatable standard for awarding attorneys'
fees in NLRB v. Food Store Employees, Local 347, 417 U.S. 1 (1974). 668 F.2d at 775. To the
contrary, in that case, the Supreme Court specifically reserved the question of the Board's power
under Section 10(c) to award fees at all. 417 U.S. at 8 n.9. See supratext accompanying notes 146-47.
213. 668 F.2d at 777.
214. 249 N.L.R.B. 1085, 1088, 104 L.R.R.M. 1319-20. (1980).
215. Id. at 1085 n.2, 104 L.R.R.M. at 1320.
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ruled the AUL's recommendation of attorneys' fees in Admiral Merchants

Motor Freight, Inc. 216 The Board affirmed the AL's findings that the

employer violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) by deliberately bypassing the

union and directly bargaining with unit employees for contract concessions, 217 describing the employer's defenses as "specious" 218 and with "no
basis for support in law or fact." 219 However, the Board refused to award
fees because the employer was not "a repeat offender 220 nor shown to be
"engaged in a pattern of unlawful antiunion conduct for the purpose of
denying all of its employees the exercise of the rights guaranteed
employees by Section 7 of the Act."221 Further, the Board found that the
employer had not "intentionally used defenses meritless on their face in a
clear attempt to burden the processes of the Board and the courts."
These characterizations had never before been used as required elements
for fee shifting. While the Board had shown some willingness in JP.
Stevens to expand fee shifting for recidivists, repeated misconduct has not
been part of the frivolous/debatable defenses standard. 23 Furthermore,
while the Board found that fee shifting achieves the purpose of freeing the
dockets of frivolous litigation, there has been no requirement of proof
that the Respondent engaged in such litigation for the specific purpose of
burdening the dockets.224
One month after deciding Admiral Merchants, the Board awarded
attorneys' fees in Autoprod, Inc.,- finding the employer's defenses to
216. 265 N.L.R.B. No. 16, 111 L.R.R.M. 1526 (1982).
217. Id. slip op. at 2-3, 111 L.R.R.M. at 1527.
218. Id. slip op. at 8-9, 111 L.R.R.M. at 1529.
219. Id. slip op. at 8, 111 L.R.R.M. at 1529.
220. Id
221. Id.
222. Id. slip op. at 9, 111 L.R.R.M. at 1529.
223. In the Board's supplemental decision awarding fees in T7idee I, there was no mention that
a respondent must be a recidivist violator in order to award fees to the charging party. Tiidee
Products, Inc., 194 N.L.R.B. 1234, 1236-37, 79 L.R.R.M. 1175, 1179 (1972) (supp. decision). In
Heck's Inc., where the Board clarified the standards for fee awards, the Board stated that the
repetition of misconduct would not be sufficient by itself to warrant the award of attomeys'fces, but
did not state that such repetition was an integral part of the frivolous/debatable standard. Heck's
Inc., 215 N.L.R.B. 765, 768, 88 L.R.R.M. 1049, 1052 (1974) (supp. decision). Further, in Wcllman
Indus., Inc., the Board reviewed the standards established by Heck's and Tiidee Products,and
awarded fees to the charging party. The Board did not, however, state that the employer's recidivism
was an essential element for its award, concentrating instead on the employer's defenses in the instant
case. The repetition of misconduct was cited as one reason for requiring the employer to mail and
read the remedial notice to the employees. Wellman Indus., Inc., 248 N.L.R.B. 325, 325-29, 103
L.R.R.M. 1483, 1483-88 (1980).
224. In 2lidee I, the Board stated: "The policy of the Act to insure industrial peace through
collective bargaining can only be effectuated when speedy access to uncrowded Board and court
dockets is available. Accordingly, in order to discourage future frivolous litigation... we ... order
Respondent to reimburse the Board and the Union for their expenses ... ." Tidee Prods., Inc.,
194 N.L.R.B. 1234, 1236,79 L.R.R.M. 1175, 1179 (1972) (supp. decision).
225. 265 N.L.R.B. No.42, III L.R.R.M. 1521 (1982).
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Section 8(a)(5) charges to be "patently frivolous."2 26 The violations
included the employer's attempt to avoid its obligation to bargain with
the union pursuant to a reopener clause by asserting that no contract
existed, even though the company president had signed a draft of the
contract.227 In this case, unlike Admiral Merchants,the Board found that
"[t]he Respondent's flagrant misconduct... caps a decade of contumacy
and flagrant disregard of its employees' rights under the Act during which
the Respondent has flouted court-enforced orders of the Board and persistently ignored its statutory obligations. 2 28 In Autoprod, therefore, the
emphasis on the employer's status as a repeat offender, in addition to its
frivolous defenses, confirms the Board's increasingly restricted view of fee
shifting.2 29
In addition to awarding fees for the respondent's bad faith conduct
underlying the litigation, the Board could order fee shifting, in accordance
with federal court precedent for a bad faith conduct during the course of
litigation. However, the Board thus far has refused to make such awards.
In Standard Homes, Inc.,230 the Board refused to award litigation
expenses against the employer, which had refused to produce subpoenaed
documents and admitted that it was simply ignoring the subpoena. 23' In
East Bay Chevrolet Co., d/b/a/ Time Chevrolet,232 the ALT described
"Respondent's trickery"23 3 in attempting to modify a bargaining unit de234
scription in the contract in order to obtain a decertification election.
The Board adopted the AL's denial of attorneys' fees despite its finding
that "the conduct complained of by the charging party may be lacking in
good faith."23 5 The Board overruled the AL's recommended order of
litigation expenses in Kings Terrace Nursing Home and Health Facility,236 where the employer's attorney had engaged in bad faith litigation
226.
227.

Id. slip op. at6, II1 L.R.R.M. at 1522.
Id. slip op. at 3-6, 111 L.R.R.M. at 1521-22. Respondent also violated Section 8(a)(5) by

its failure to pay employee benefits under the contract and under an arbitrator's award. Id

228. Id. slip op. at 2, 111 L.R.R.M. at 1521. Respondent had previously been found in
violation of Sections 8(a)(1), (3) and (5) by its conduct during the union's organizing campaign and its
subsequent bad faith bargaining. Id slip op. at 2-5, 111 L.R.R.M. at 1521.
229. The Board stated: "In these circumstances, and in the light of the Respondent's long
history of intransigence, we conclude that the traditional forms of relief are inadequate as a means of
effectuating the policies of the Act and serving the public interest." Id. slip op. at 6, 111 L.R.R.M. at
1522.
230. 249 NLRB 1085, 104 L.R.R.M. 1319 (1980).
231. Id. at 1085 n.2, 1088, 104 L.R.R.M. at 1320.
232. 242 N.L.R.B. 625, 101 L.R.R.M. 1229 (1979), aff'd, 659 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir. 1981)
233. Id. at 631, 101 L.R.R.M. at 1231.
234. Id at 630-31, 101 L.R.R.M. at 1231.
235. Id. at 626, 101 L.R.R.M. at 1231. Specifically, the conduct complained of was directed to
Respondent's attorneys'efforts to modify the unit by "trickery." The union had asked that the Board
institute disciplinary proceedings against the attorney. Id. at 626, 631, 101 L.R.R.M. at 1230, 1231.
236. 227 N.L.R.B. 251,94 LR.R.M. 1081 (1976).
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tactics. The morning of trial, the employer's attorney told the ALJ that

his witnesses were unavailable that day because they were testifying in
another proceeding.2 3 7 Though the AI continued the trial to the next
day to allow the employer to present its witnesses, neither the employer
nor its attorney appeared.2 38 Instead, the employer's attorney told the
General Counsel by telephone that the case had been settled, though it
had not.239 Despite these misrepresentations by the respondent's attorney,
the Board found no evidence of bad faith.240
Thus, there is ample support for Board authority to award attorneys'
fees under Seciton 10(c), and in fact, for more liberal awards by the Board
within the common law exceptions to the American Rule. In an area
where existing statutory remedies have been repeatedly criticized as weak
and ineffective, the Board should be encouraged to use its full remedial
powers. The Board's current narrowing approach to fee shifting, evidenced by Admiral Merchants,is particularly distressing in its imposition
of an even higher standard of proof for fee awards. The denial of attorneys' fees where defenses are frivolous but the respondent is not a repeat
offender "makes a mockery of the administrative process by interposing
frivolous roadblocks to the enforcement of public rights." 2 4 1
FEE SHIFTING UNDER THE EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT

While the permissible scope of fee shifting by the NLRB under
Section 10(c) remains an open question, there has also been a new development with regard to attorneys' fees awards against the NLRB and
other federal agencies. The Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA),242 which

237. Id. at 253, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1081.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 251, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1081. For examples of federal court cases awarding fees based
on bad faith conduct during the course of litigation, see, e.g., Analytica, Inc. v. NPD Research, Inc.,
708 F.2d 1263 (7th Cir. 1983) (fees awarded against attorneys for their bad faith opposition to motion
to disqualify); Lipsig v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 663 F.2d 178, 181-82 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (fees
awarded against defendant for its bad faith conduct in litigating its counter claim, including the use of
dilatory tactics during discovery and courtroom hearings, failure to meet filing deadlines, and
misleading the court by misquoting or omitting material portions of documentary evidence).
241. This phrase was used by the ALI in Admiral Merchants to describe the result of permitting the Respondent to advance its frivolous defenses. 265 N.L.R.B. slip op. at 9 (AU's decision). The
Ai placed this description in the context of the newly enacted EAJA: "Congress has expressed its
view that Government ought not proceed against certain respondents in frivolous cases and has thus
created machinery for recovery of litigation expenses against the Government in such cases. (Equal
Access to Justice Act) [citation omitted]. Respondents likewise should not be permitted to make a
mockery of the administrative process by interposing frivolous roadblocks to the enfoicement of
public rights." Id.
242. Pub. L. No. 96-481, §§203(a) (1), 204(a), 94 Stat. 2325,2327 (1980) (codified as 5 U.S.C.
§504 (1976 & Supp. V 1981); 28 U.S.C. 2412 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
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became effective October 1, 1981,243 provides for attorneys'fees awards to
a prevailing party sued by a federal agency, unless the agency can prove

substantial justification for its position or unless other circumstances
would render the award unjust. 244

Some interesting questions may be raised concerning the appropriateness of the provisions of EAJA generally, and their application to the
NLRB in particular. The treatment of these questions will be the subject
of this section of the article. The equities of EAJA will be examined in the
context of the general federal principles of fee shifting and in the specific
context of NLRB proceedings, especially as compared with the present
Board posture toward fee shifting.
GeneralProvisionsof EAJA
The EAJA represents a major inroad on the two traditional doctrines of sovereign immunity245 and the American Rule against fee shifting. Certain provisions make the federal government liable in civil litiga-

tion for attorneys' fees to the same extent as any private litigant, while
other provisions create new fee shifting exceptions under which the federal government is subject to greater liability for attorneys' fees than
private litigants. The EAJA amends 28 U.S.C. §2412 to permit courts to
award attorneys' fees and expenses "to the prevailing party in any civil
action brought by or against the United States" to the same extent as in
cases involving private parties where awards are made under common

243. The EAJA contains a "sunset provision," effective October 1, 1984, repealing 5 U.S.C.
§504 and 28 U.S.C. §2412(d). Pub. L. 96-481, §§203(c), 204(c) (1980). The cost and effect of the
EAJA will be reviewed at this time. H.R. Rep. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 12, reprintedin 1980
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 4784, 4991. There has been one congressional oversight committee
review of the EAJA since its enactment.
244. A number of articles examined the EAJA shortly after its effective date, with generally
favorable reactions to its enactment. See Dods and Kennedy, The Equal Access to Justice Act, 50
U.M.K.C.L. REv. 48 (1981); Peterson, The NLRB and Equal Access to Justice: A Promise
Unfulfilled?, 34 LAB. L.J. 266 (1983); Robertson and Fowler, Recovering Attorneys' Feesfrom the
Government Under the EqualAccess to Justice Act, 56 TULANE L. Rev. 903 (1982); Simmons, The
"EqualAccess to Justice Act" PrivateEnforcement ofPublic Contract Law, 12 PuB. CONT.L.J. 284
(1982); Note, Will the Sun Rise Againfor the EqualAccess to JusticeAct?, 48 BROOKLYN L. REv. 265
(1982) [hereinafter cited as Sun Rise]; Note, Civil Procedure-Attorney's Fees-Recovery of
Attorney's Fees Against the UnitedStates-The EqualAccess to Justice Act, Pub. L No. 96-481, 94
Stat. 2325 (1980), 10 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 723 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Recovery of Attorney's Fees]Note, The Award of Attorney's Fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 11 HOFSTRA L. REv. 307
(1982) [hereinafter cited as EqualAccess]; But see Derfner, supranote 62, at n.58 and n.95, expressing
disapproval of the attempts to pass "omnibus" legislation such as the EAJA.
245. The Sovereign immunity doctrine protects the United States from suit, unless exceptions
are explicitly provided for by statute. See the discussion of sovereign immunity and the EAJA in Sun
Rise, supranote 244, at 273-77.
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law and statutory exceptions to the American Rule. 246 Additionally, 28
U.S.C. §2412(d)(1)(A) states that "a court shall award to a prevailing
party other than the United States fees and other expenses... incurred
by that party in any civil action [other than torts] brought by or against
the United States... unless the court finds that the position of the United
States was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an
award unjust." The parallel statute for litigation before administrative
agencies, 5 U.S.C. §504, provides for attorneys' fees to be awarded to the
prevailing party other than the United States, in adversary adjudications, 247 unless the adjudicative officer finds substantial justification for
the agency's position, or unless special circumstances would make an
award unjust. 248 The prevailing party dissatisfied with the agency level fee
determination may seek discretionary review in the appropriate federal
court. 249 If review is granted, the federal court may modify the agency
decision only upon finding that the agency abused its discretion.25 0 The
federal review court also is empowered under 28 U.S.C. §2412(d)(3) to
make initial determinations of fee awards upon judicial review of the
merits of an adversary adjudication unless the government can fulfill the
substantial justification or special circumstances criteria.25'
Thus, as applied to NLRB proceedings, an award may be made to a
prevailing respondent by a federal circuit court of appeals which finds
that the General Counsel's conduct falls within the common law bad faith
exception to the American Rule. The court may also award fees if, upon
review of the merits of a Board order remedying unfair labor practices,
the court has refused to enforce the order, and subsequently finds that the
General Counsel's position was not substantially justified and that no
special circumstances existed which would make an award unjust. A
prevailing respondent may also be awarded attorneys' fees by an AUJ or
246. 28 U.S.C. §2412(b). This provision is not subject to the sunset provision. See supranote
243. 28 U.S.C. §2412(d)(2)(A) defines "fees and other expenses" as including attorneys' fees as well as
other litigation expenses, such as expert witness fees and studies. This section also provides for a
maximum of $75 an hour for attorneys' fees unless otherwise determined by the court. 5 U.S.C.
§504(b)(1)(A) identically defines "fees and other expenses" as well as the maximum hourly rate, for
administrative agency proceedings.
247. "Adversary adjudication" is defined by 5 U.S.C. §504(b)(1)(C), which in turn refers to
adjudications under 5 U.S.C. §554, where the position of the United States is represented by counsel
or otherwise.
248. 5 U.S.C. §504(a)(l) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
249. 5 U.S.C. §504(c)(2) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
250. Id.
251. Fees awarded against an agency are to be made by that agency, from funds appropriated
to the agency for that purpose. Otherwise, fees are paid by the General Accounting Office in
accordance with 28 U.S.C. §§2414, 2517. 5 U.S.C. §504(d)(I); 28 U.S.C. §2412(d)(4)(A). 28 U.S.C.
§2412(c)(2) also provides that fee awards based on a finding of governmental bad faith are to be paid
by the specific agency.
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by the Board reviewing the ALJ's fee determination, under the substantial
justification and special circumstances criteria.
The purpose behind the EAJA has been stated in various ways,
based on the assumption that private civil litigants sued by the federal
government feel coerced into compliance with the government's position
because of the government's "greater resources and expertise" in litigation.252 Thus, Congress concluded that fee shifting against the government
was necessary in order to encourage private litigants to defend against
"unreasonable governmental action."25 3 Awards of attorneys' fees are
intended to reduce the perceived economic deterrents to litigation and the
economic disparity between private litigants and their government.25 4 The
fee shifting has been described as well, as reflecting "a strong movement
by Congress toward placing the Federal Government and civil litigants on
a completely equal footing."2 55
The congressional basis for the EAJA also has been articulated as
the recognition "that a party who chooses to litigate an issue against the
Government is not only representing his or her own vested interest but is
also refining and formulating public policy."2 56 This general statement is
surprising, in light of the historic use of this private attorney general
theory only in connection with isolated statutes representing important
public policy. 257
The EAJA places the burden of proof on the government to provide
proof that its position was substantially justified or to show special circumstances rendering an award unjust.25 8 The standard of proof is identical for prevailing plaintiffs and defendants.2 5 9 The substantial justification
test is described in the legislative history as "essentially one of reasonableness"26 with no award appropriate where the government proves that "its
case had a reasonable basis in both law and fact. ' 261 The House Report
includes.some examples of case dispositions which signal the possibility
252. H.R. REP. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d. Sess. 9, reprintedin 1980 U.S. CODE CONG.& AD.
NEWS 4984.
253. Id. at 5, 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEwS at 4984. The EAJA applies both to parties
acting as plaintiffs against the government and as defendants. With regard to applications for
attorneys' fees under 5 U.S.C. §504 by parties who have successfully defended against agency prosecutions, the EAJA will, therefore, be relevant only for defendants. Respondents in unfair labor
practice litigation before the NLRB fit into this category of defendants.
254. Id. at 5-6, 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 4984.
255. Id. at 9, 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 4987.
256. Id. at 10, 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 4988.
257. Derfner, supra note 62, at 260-61.
258. 5 U.S.C. §504(a)(1); 28 U.S.C. §2412(d)(1)(A); 28 U.S.C. §2412(d)(3).
259. H.R. REP. No. 1418,96th Cong., 2d Sess. 10, reprintedin 1980 U.S. CODE CONG.& AD.
NEWS at 4989.
260. Id.
261. Id.
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that the government's position was not substantially justified.2 62 These
dispositions include cases where there was ajudgment on the pleadings or
a directed verdict or where a prior suit on the same claim had been
dismissed. 263 The House Report also explains the "special circumstances"
standard as a "safety valve" to protect good faith governmental litigation
2 64
seeking novel extensions or interpretations of the law.
The placement of the burden of proof is justified in the legislative
history as a logical choice of placing the burden on the party with readier
access to relevant evidence. 265 Though the House Report recommending
passage of the EAJA disclaimed the creation of a presumption against the
government, 266 the Report also states that "[i]t is intended that ... an
award will be made unless the government comes forward with a showing
that its case was substantially justified or special circumstances make an
award unjust." 267
The EAJA also provides restrictions on the eligibility of private
parties for fee awards under the substantial justification standard, in an
attempt to conform to the expressed purpose of encouraging small businesses to litigate against the government.2 68 According to the legislative
history, eligible parties include individuals whose net worth is less than
one million dollars and corporations and other businesses whose net
worth is less than five million dollars.269 The statute also provides for
eligibility for businesses with less than 500 employees. 270 Though the
legislative history interprets this final limitation as excluding from eligibility any business with more than 500 employees, regardless of its net
worth, 271 the actual wording of 28 U.S.C. §2412(c)(2)(B) in the disjunctive
would include as eligible a business with less than five million dollars net
27 2
worth, but more than 500 employees.
262. Id at 11, 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 4989-90.
263. Id
264. Id.
265. Id. at 10-11, 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 4989.
266. Id. at 11, 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 4990.
267. Id. at 16, 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 4995. This statement was made with
regard to Section 504(c)(1) which directs each agency to promulgate rules under the EAJA. The
House Report expressed the congressional intention that these rules provide for an award of fees
unless the government carries its burden of proof.
268. Id at 9-10, 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 4988.
269. H.R. REP. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 9, 1980 U.S. CODE CONO. & AD. NEws at
4987-88.
270. Id. at 11-12, 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 4990.
271. Id.
272. 5 U.S.C. §504(b)(l)(B) specifically "excludes"from eligibility any business with more than
500 employees, which would exclude such businesses regardless of net worth. 28 U.S.C. §2412(d)(2)(B)
defines "party" as including three categories of businesses, and is written in the disjunctive form.
Therefore, a business with a net worth of less than $5 million would be included, regardless of the
number of employees.
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A party eligible under the financial standards for a potential fee
award must also be a prevailing party.273 The legislative intent was for
274
interpretation of the term consistent with other fee shifting statutes.
Thus, a party may qualify without having achieved a total victory, and
without having participated in a full trial on the merits. 275 Examples from
the legislative history of prevailing parties under this definition include a
party who has won a favorable settlement; a party who does not ultimately prevail on all the issues; and a defendant in litigation where the
276
plaintiff has sought a voluntary dismissal of a groundless complaint.
GeneralCritiqueof the EAJA
While the literature on the EAJA identifies some criticism which has
been voiced about the EAJA, generally commentators have responded
favorably to the passage and implementation of the statute. 277 Though the
general purpose of the EAJA of enabling weaker parties to litigate against
unreasonable governmental legislation may be laudable, examination of
the statute under its surface appeal reveals serious problems both with the
passage of the statute and with its application. The general problems with
the statute become apparent when the EAJA is studied in light of the
development of the American Rule and its exceptions.
Criticism of the EAJA has come from a number of sources, including the Department of Justice. The Justice Department opposed the
Senate Bill 265, from which the EAJA was derived, 278 and submitted its
own proposal for fee shifting against the government, authorizing fee
awards when the government's position was found to be "'arbitrary,
frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless,' or that the government continued
the proceedings after its position clearly became so." 279 The Justice
Department supported its proposal, based on the ChristiansburgGarment standard for fee shifting against defendants, with the theory that this
standard was sufficient to ensure that fee shifting would be ordered where
the government had acted in bad faith or unreasonably by applying a
higher standard to the government's conduct than the common law bad
273. 28 U.S.C. §2412(b); 5 U.S.C. §504(a)(1) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
274. H.R. REP. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 11, reprintedin 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws at 4990.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. See supra note 244.
278. Two days of hearings were held on S.265, on May 20 and June 24, 1980. See Award of
Attorneys' Fees Against the Federal Government: Hearings on S. 265 Before the Subcomm. on
Courts, Civil Liberties,andtheAdministrationof Justice of the House JudiciaryComm., 96th Cong.,
2d. Sess. (1980) [hereinafter cited as Hearingson S.265].
279. H.R. REP. No. 7208, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
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faith exception to the American Rule. 280 The proposed standard at the
same time would protect against the chilling effect on government
enforcement of statutory policies perceived by the Justice Department. 281
In the Department's view, the substantial justification standard is overly
harsh, and "invite[s] judicial second guessing and substitution by the
courts of their judgment for the judgment of government attorneys." 282
Further, the Department criticized the new layer of litigation as burden283
some, inevitably resulting in "a retrial on the merits."
The fear that the substantial justification standard would chill
government enforcement of public interest statutes was expressed by
organizations outside the government as well. The AFL-CIO opposed the
harsher standard of S. 265 because:
Such a standard would inhibit vigorous enforcement of the regulatory
laws enacted by the Congress to protect the people of this country, not
only by inducing a narrow and overly-cautious approach by the
agency lest it risk depletion of its budget through fee awards, but by
diverting agency resources and personnel into litigation of the justifiability of the Government's position in initiating the action which is
284
ultimately unsuccessful.
The problem of the cost of the fee shifting litigation stems not only
from the necessity of utilizing agency personnel to litigate the fee issue.
High costs have been projected based on actual litigation expenses
involved in litigating whether the government's position was substantially
justified, as well as the other issues involved in the fee question, such as
eligibility of the prevailing party and whether the party has indeed prevailed in the litigation on the merits. 285 The Congressional Budget Office
estimated the total cost of implementing the EAJA over three years as
$330 million. 286 Actual experience has resulted in lower costs than first
87
estimated.
280. Hearingson S. 265, supranote 278, at 40 (statement of Alice Daniel, Assistant Attorney
General, Civil Division, Department of Justice).
281. laat40-41.
282. Id. at 39.
283. IL at 42.
284. Id. at 563 (correspondence from Director Ray Denison, Department of Legislation,
AFL-CIO). See also id. at 74 (statement of Mary Frances Derfner, Director, Attorneys' Fees Project,
Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law); id. at 92 (statement of Nancy Drabble, Acting
Director, Public Citizen Congress Watch); id. at 558 (correspondence from Karen Christenson,
Legislative Counsel, American Civil Liberties Union).
285. Id. at 42 (statement of Alice Daniel, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, Department of Justice).
286. H.R. REP. No. 1418,96th Cong., 2d Sess. 21, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG.& AD.

NEws at 5000.
287. Actual costs of the EAJA during the first nine months of its enactment have been cited as
less than $1 million. Equal Access, supra note 244, at n.186.
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Other problems arise from the eligibility standards which suffer from
a lack of meaningful definitions of small businesses, which the legislation
was designed to benefit. The definition of a small business is a value-laden
concept, stemming from the American egalitarian tradition. This philosophy attaches negative characteristics to big business, as opposed to a
positive view of small business as embodying American entrepreneurial
values. Based upon this historical background, it would be reasonable to
cast legislation designed to be of benefit to business in general in terms of
its benefiting small business. This could be accomplished by broadly
defining small business, thereby resulting in statutory eligibility for the
vast majority of businesses in the country. The definitions themselves
could be accepted as proper, however, because of basic misconceptions of
the actual size of most "big" businesses; many businesses logically viewed
as "big" based on annual receipts actually fit easily within statutory definitions based on size factors such as number of employees.
In the analysis of the definitions of small business in the EAJA, this
perspective is found to have significant explanatory power. Arguably, the
net worth criterion in the EAJA provides the most expansive approach to
defining business size, due to the potential for applying accounting procedures to result in an unrealistically deflated net worth figure. 288 Furthermore, the net worth figure of five million dollars has been criticized as
"excluding virtually nobody. 2 89 Thus, the net worth criterion is meaningless in determining the size of a business. This conclusion is reinforced by
comparison of the EAJA net worth standard with the criteria applied by
the major business reference publications such as Dun's Business Rankings,
which ranks business size by annual sales volume and by the number of
290
employees.
The House Report on S. 265 shows that the limit of 500 employees
was added to the eligibility requirements by the House Committee on the
Judiciary on review of the Senate bill, apparently in response to the
criticism of the net worth standard.291 The cap of 500 employees, how288. Hearingson S. 265, supranote 278, at 86 (statement of Nan Aron, Director, Council for
Public Interest Law); Sun Rise, note 244, at 284.
289. Hearings on S. 265, supra note 278, at 76-77. (statement of Mary Frances Derfner,
Director, Attorneys' Fees Project, Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law). Derfner also
stated that of the approximately one million corporations in the United States, only ten to twenty
thousand have a net worth of over $5 million, and that "it would be a surprise if more than a handful"
of the approximately ten million partnerships and proprietorships have a net worth of more than $5
million. Id. at 79.
290. Dun's Business Rankings (Dun's Marketing Services) (1982), at VI. The Small Business
Administration regulations also apply almost exclusively the standards of annual receipts and
number of employees to define small businesses. 13 C.F.R. §§121.3-10 - 121.3-16 (1979).
291. H.R. REP. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 15, reprintedin1980 U.S. CODE CONG.& AD.
NEWs at 4994.
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ever, does even less than the net worth standard to limit the number of
businesses which can meet the eligibility requirements. The most recent
United States Census Bureau figures show that of the 4,543,000 business
establishments in the United States, only 33,000, less than one percent,
employ 250 or more employees. 292 In Dun's Business Rankings, in the
category of Businesses Ranked by Size, only 1,728 private businesses and
only 3,645 publicly owned businesses in the United States employ over
293
500 employees.
The statistics cited above show the misleading nature of the statutory
provisions and the legislative history of EAJA in defining small business.
The figures of the number of employees result in ineligibility for only a
narrow segment of the population of business establishments. This result
is inconsistent with the stated purpose of the EAJA and its eligibility
requirements as "limit[ing] the bill's applications to those persons and
small businesses for whom costs may be a deterrent to vindicating their
rights." 294 For example, it is unlikely that a well-known corporation such
as the American Stock Exchange, Inc., which employs 500 employees,
would be deterred from litigation without the attorneys' fees provisions of
the EAJA.295
Other evidence has been cited as identifying a congressional purpose
of interpreting the eligibility standards in favor of broader inclusion of
businesses. The House Report defines net worth as the difference between
total assets and total liabilities, with the value of assets to be determined by
the cost of acquisition rather than fair market value. 296 The Model Rules of
the Administrative Conference of the United States have cited this section
of the legislative history as expressing congressional intent to permit the
297
low valuation of assets, thereby enlarging the set of eligible parties.
292. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES. NATIONAL DATA BOOK AND GUIDE TO
SOURCES, U.S. DEPARTMENTOF COMMERCE, BUREAU OFTHE CENSUS 530 (103d Ed. 1982-83).
293. Dun's Business Rankings, supra note 290, at 1266.
294. H.R. REP. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 15, reprintedin 1980 U.S. CODE CONG.& AD,
NEWS 4994.
295. Dun's Business Rankings, supra note 290, at 1266. Other exemptions from the EAJA's
eligibility requirements add to the number of large businesses eligible for fees. Excluded from the net
worth limits are cooperative associations as defined in the Agricultural Marketing Act (12 U.S.C.
§1 141j(a)) and organizations described in section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (26
U.S.C. §501 (c)(3)) exempt from taxation under section 501(a) of the Code. 28 U.S.C. §2412(d)(2)(B)
(ii) (1976 & Supp. V 1981); 5 U.S.C. §504(b)(l)(B)(II) (1982); H.R. REP. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d

Sess. 15, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 4994. The cooperatives defined in the
Agricultural Marketing Act include six cooperatives on the 1979 Fortune 500 list: Agway; Gold Kist;
Farmland Industries; Land O'Lakes; C.F. Industries; and Midland Cooperative. Hearingson S. 265.
supranote 278, at 86 (statement of Nan Aron, Director, Council for Public Interest Law). Further, as
noted during the hearings on S. 265, the EAJA would not exclude small trade associations which
represent large corporations in litigation. Id.
296. H.R. REP. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 15, reprintedin 1980 U.S. CODE CONG.& AD.
NEws at 4994.
297. 46 Fed. Reg. 32,907 (1981); EqualAccess, supra note 244, at 316.
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Most disturbing of all objections to the EAJA focuses on the burden
and standard of proof in the EAJA as effecting a complete upheaval of
the historic theoretical justification for fee shifting legislation. 298 ,Congress
had previously authorized fee shifting in order to encourage private
enforcement of important statutory public policies. 299 Under the EAJA,
though, Congress for the first time will be using fee shifting to deter
governmental enforcement of public policies. 300 The EAJA thus creates
an entirely new exception to the American Rule. Witnesses testifying
before Congress against S. 265 noted that prior to this legislation, all fee
shifting statutes could be categorized within the private attorney general
or bad faith exceptions to the American Rule.3 0' The major change in the
fee shifting theory precipitated by S. 265 led one witness to describe the bill
as an "unprecedented form [ ] of fee legislation for which no parallel
exists, either here or in any other country in the world."3 02
In addition to the major change in the general theory of fee shifting,
the EAJA reverses the traditional "pro-plaintiff' approach to fee shifting.303 Under all fee shifting statutes based on the private attorney general
theory, awards to the prevailing party have been interpreted to provide
virtually automatic fee awards to the prevailing plaintiff acting as "the
chosen instrument of Congress to vindicate" important public policies. 304
The same term, "prevailing party," has been interpreted as providing for
fee awards to defendants only where the defendant proves that the plaintiffs action was "frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation."305 This
298. See Hearings on S. 265, supra note 278, at 44 (testimony of Alice Daniel, Assistant
Attorney General, Civil Division, Department of Justice); id. at 75-80 (statement of Mary Frances
Derfner, Director, Attorneys' Fees Project, Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law); id. at
80-82 (testimony of Armand Derfner, Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law); id. at 83-85
(statement of Nan Aron, Director, Council for Public Interest Law); id. at 92-93 (statement of Nancy
Drabble, Acting Director, Public Citizen Congress Watch); id. at 563 (correspondence from Ray
Denison, Director, Department of Legislation, AFL-CIO); id. at 558-59 (cofrespondence from
Karen Christensen, Legislative Counsel, ACLU).
299. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. The Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240,263 (1975); Hearings
on S. 265, supra note 278, at 75 (statement of Mary Frances Derfner, Director, Attorneys' Fees
Project, Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law); id. at 84 (statement of Nan Aron,
Director, Council for Public Interest Law).
300. Id. at 41 (testimony of Alice Daniel, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, Department of Justice); id. at 75, 77 (statement of Mary Frances Derfner, Director, Attorneys' Fees Pioject,
Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law).
301. Id. at 41 (testimony of Mary Frances Derfner, Director, Attorneys' Fees Project, Lawyers
Committee for Civil Rights Under Law); id. at 84 (statement of Nan Aron, Director, Council for
Public Interest Law).
302. Id. at 75 (statement of Mary Frances Derfner, Director, Attorneys' Fees Project, Lawyers
Committee for Civil Rights Under Law).
303. Derfner, supra note 62, at 269.
304. Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 418 (1978). See supra text accompanying notes 65-74.
305. Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978). See supra text accompanying notes 71-74.
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discriminatory application of the identical term is justified by the public
nature of the plaintiff's role as compared with the defendant's. 306 The
EAJA creates the unique situation of providing for fee awards to defendants resisting government enforcement under a standard which is far less
stringent than the ChristiansburgGarment "frivolous litigation" standard

for defendants. Thus, the EAJA provides for a "pro-defendant" bias for
30 7

fee shifting.
The reversal of the pro-plaintiff fee shifting theory is further aggravated by two characteristics of the EAJA. First, the burden of proof of
substantial justification is placed on the government. 30 8 Second, the construction of the statute necessarily creates a presumption that the
government's position is not substantially justified. 30 9 As a result, the
combined effect of the standard of proof, the burden of proof and the

presumption against the government's position significantly tips the balance in favor of the defendant, "impos[ing] on the United States, burdens
borne by no other litigant, private or public."3 10
The legislative history deals with the problem of the presumption
against the government only on a superficial level; the House Report
merely states that no presumption is created by the statute.3 1' This disclaimer does not, however, avoid the inevitable conclusion, based on the
construction of the statute analyzed against the evidentiary law of presumptions, that a presumption does exist. A presumption has been
defined as "a concept or rule of law regarding the effect that should be
given to evidence. Once a fact or group of facts are established in an
306. Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412,419 (1978). One court justified the
distinction as follows: "The government has set up a regulatory system for the benefit of persons in
the plaintiff's class. To make the regulation effective, private suits as well as public prosecutions are
permitted. Suits by plaintiffs, if well founded, are in the public interest .... The defendant's vindication in a larger sense serves the interests of justice, but no more so than the successful defense of any
suit." Hutchinson v. William C. Barry, Inc., 50 F.Supp. 292,298 (D. Mass. 1943), quoted in Derfner,
supra note 62, at 270.
307. As noted in Derfner, supranote 62, at n.78, prior to EAJA, no statute, with the exception
of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, provided ready recovery of fees by defendants.
308. The House Report states that placing the burden of proof on the prevailing party makes
awards too difficult to obtain, without lessening the deterrent effect created by the cost of litigation
against the government. H.R. REP. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 14, reprintedin 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS at 4993.
309. Though the legislative history denies the creation of a presumption against the government, witnesses during the congressional hearings on S. 265 found such a presumption to exist. See
Hearingson S. 265, supranote 278, at 42 (statement of Alice Daniel, Assistant Attorney General,
Civil Division, Department of Justice); id. at 77 n.8 (statement of Mary Frances Derfner, Director,
Attorneys' Fees Project, Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law); id. at 85 (statement of Nan
Aron, Director, Council for Public Interest Law).
310. Hearingson S. 265, supranote 278 at 76 (statement of Mary Frances Derfner, Director,
Attorneys'.Fees Project, Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law).
311. H.R. REp.No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 13, reprintedin 1980 U.S. CODE CONG.& AD.
NEws at 4990.
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action, another fact or group of facts must be assumed to exist in the
absence of sufficient rebuttal evidence."n31 2 Under the administrative
agency provisions of the EAJA, "an agency that conducts an adversary
adjudication shall award, to a prevailing party ... fees and other
expenses incurred by the party... unless the adjudicative officer of the
agency finds that the position of the agency.., was substantiallyjustified.
*..313 (emphasis added). The allocation of the burden of proof is identical for civil actions in federal court, 314 and for federal review of administrative adjudications. 315 In all EAJA litigation, the prevailing party must
go forward with evidence that it has prevailed and is eligible to receive a
fee award.316 The prevailing party also must allege the amount sought and
that the government's position was not substantially justified. 31 7 Once the
prevailing party satisfies this burden of going forward, the fee must be
awarded unless the government fulfills its burden of persuasion.3 18 In
other words, the prevailing party's allegations establish a presumption
that it is entitled to attorneys' fees unless the government disproves the
presumption by proving that its position was substantially justified. 319
This statutory construction adheres directly to the Morgan theory of
presumptions, followed by a minority of jurisdictions. 320 The Morgan
approach gives greater weight to presumptions than the Thayer approach,
adopted in the Federal Rules of Evidence. 321 According to the Morgan
approach, "when a presumption is established the burden of persuasion
also shifts to the party against whom the presumption operates. This
party must then convince the trier that the nonexistence of the presumed
fact is more probable than its existence."322
312. Note, Civil Presumptions in Michigan: Dissipating the Cloud of Confusion that Surrounds Rebuttable Presumptions,3 DETROIT C. L. REv. 565, 566 (1982).
313. 5 U.S.C. §504(a)(1) (1982).
314. 28 U.S.C. §2412(d)(IXA) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
315. 28 U.S.C. §2412(d)(3) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
316. 5 U.S.C. §504(a)(2) (1982); 28 U.S.C. §2412(dXl)(B) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
317. Id.; H.R. REP. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 13, reprintedin 1980 U.S,. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws at 4992.
318. 5 U.S.C. §504(a)(2) (1982); 28 U.S.C. §2412(d)(1)(B) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). The House
Report states, "In order to defeat an award, the government must show that its case had a reasonable
basis in law and fact." H.R. REP. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 13, reprintedin 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws at 4992.
319. "It is intended that the rules [under Section 504(c)(1)] specify that an award will be made
unless the government come[s] forward with a showing that its case was substantially justified or
special circumstances make an award unjust." H.R. REP. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. at 16,
reprintedin 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 4995.
320. Note, supranote 312, at 567-68.
321. Id. at 567-68, 574-75.
322. Id. at 568. The author cites numerous works by Professor Morgan. See Morgan, Some
Observations ConcerningPresumptions,44 HARV. L. REv. 906 (1931); Morgan & Maguire, Looking
Backward and Forwardat Evidence, 50 HARV. L. REv. 909 (1937); Morgan, Instructing the Jury
Upon Presumptionsand Burden and Proof,47 HARv. L. REv. 59 (1933).
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The Department of Justice objected to the presumption created by
S. 265 against the government. 323 The witness from the Justice Department told the House Judiciary Subcommittee that S. 265 was the only fee
shifting statute stated in "absolute terms."324 Further, the Justice Department found the presumption particularly objectionable because it reverses

officials act lawfully and in
the common law presumption that public 325

good faith in performing their public duties.
As noted earlier, the EAJA is based on the premise that a private
party litigating against the government represents public and private
interests. This view of the private litigant, particularly parties defending
against governmental actions, is unconvincing in light of the congressional pattern of authorizing fee shifting in order to encourage private
enforcement of specifically identified public policies. 326 By contrast, the
EAJA is omnibus legislation, authorizing fee shifting in virtually all civil
litigation against the federal government, regardless of whether public or
private interests are served. 327 Under such an indiscriminate approach, the
premise that public interests are served where the government is a party is
rendered meaningless.
Where Congress has chosen to effect such a major upheaval of the
American Rule and to place unprecedented burdens on the government
as litigant, there should be important, clearly identifiable purposes fulfilled by the unique legislation.328 Rather, the legislative history of the
EAJA reflects Congress' overreaction to the current administration's war
cry of "overregulation" and governmental "harassment."3 29 The legislative
history cites no attempt to rationally study governmental litigation to
323. Hearings on S. 265, supra note 278, at 42 (statement of Alice Daniel, Assistant Attorney
General, Civil Division, Department of Justice).
324. Id. at 44.
325. Id. at 42 (statement of Alice Daniel, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, Department of Justice).
326. A party who brings suit against the government based upon a statute designed to enforce
public interests through private litigation may be in a different position with regard to the recovery of
attorneys' fees than is the private defendant in an action filed by the government. This is because in
addition to any application of the provisions of EAJA, such a plaintiff is also eligible for attorneys'
fees from the government to the same extent as if that plaintiff were suing a private party defendant to
enforce public policy. 28 U.S.C. §2412(b).
327. Derfner, supra note 62, at 254 n.95. Derfner describes three categories of fee shifting
legislation: omnibus (authorizing fee shifting in civil litigation, regardless of the promotion of public
or private interests); specific (authorizing fee shifting under a single statute); and generic (authorizing
fee shifting for a specific category of cases). As she describes proposals leading to the EAJA: "While
on the surface bills making the United States and federal agencies liable for fees whenever they lose
almost any civil case may seem to resemble traditional attorneys' fee legislation, in fact such bills are
not only wholly unprecedented one-way omnibus legislation, but also legislation which would retard,
rather than augment, the policies of Congress." Id.
328. Hearings on S. 265, supra note 278, at 92 (statement of Nancy Drabble, Acting Director,
Public Citizen Congress Watch).
329. Id.
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determine whether any or all governmental agencies engage in bad faith
litigation and, thus, whether the EAJA is needed. 330 Instead Congress
took what has been described as a "meat ax approach"331 in passing
overly broad legislation regardless of the need. Congress' failure to study
the government's litigation record is especially puzzling in light of the fact
that federal litigators win eighty percent of their cases. 332
Critics of the EAJA did not oppose placing the parties on an equal
footing. 333 The Department of Justice's proposal for awarding fees where
government litigation was "arbitrary, unreasonable or groundless" would
place private defendants in the same position as prevailing defendants
under most fee shifting litigation and in a better position than private
defendants seeking to prove the common law bad faith exception to the
American Rule. The ChristiansburgGarment standard also fulfills the
perceived need to curb bad faith litigation by the government. The
Department of Justice proposal, therefore, provides a viable alternative to
the EAJA standards without causing a major unsupported change in fee
shifting theory.
The Equal Access to Justice Act and the NLRB
1. Philosophical Inconsistencies
One witness before the House Judiciary Committee testified that the
proposed EAJA was ".

.

. blunderbuss legislation which is guaranteed to

do enormous damage to vast areas of law for which attorneys' fees are ill
adapted and unnecessary or counterproductive." 334 Comparison of the
preftlises Upon which the EAJA is based with the actual practice of
litigants before the NLRB reveals that the NLRB fits the category of
agencies for which fee shifting to the prevailing defendant is "ill adapted."
The underlying premise justifying the standards of S. 265 expressed in the
legislative history was that private parties sued by the government will not
contest the issues if the litigation costs exceed the cost of compliance with
the government's demands. The House Report states:
For many citizens, the costs of securing vindication of their rights and
the inability to recover attorney fees preclude resort to the adjudica330. Id. at 78 (statement of Mary Frances Derfner, Director, Attorneys' Fees Project, Lawyers
Committee for Civil Rights Under Law).
331. Derfner, supranote 62, at n.95.
332. Hearings on S. 265, supra note 278, at 558-59 (correspondence of Karen Christensen,
Legislative Counsel, ACLU).

333. Under 28 U.S.C. §2412(b), parties litigating against the government are entitled to attorneys' fees to the same extent as parties in private litigation. Thus plaintiffs are entitled to the
"pro-plaintiff" approach to fee shifting authorized by Congress, while prevailing defendants against
the govern.ment will be treated on an equal footing with defendants in private litigation.

334. Hearingson S.265, supranote 278, at 76 (statement of Mary Frances Derfner, Director,
Attorneys' Fees Project, Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law).
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tory process. When the cost of contesting a Government order, for
example, exceeds the amount at stake, a party has no realistic choice
cases, it is more practical to endure
and no effective remedy. In these
335
an injustice than to contest it.
Thus, the EAJA is based on a cost-benefit analysis: a business faced with
prosecution by a federal agency will accede to the government's wishes if
it concludes that the costs of compliance are less than the costs of litigation. As discussed earlier, however, this cost-benefit approach is inaccurate as applied to litigation before the NLRB. 336 Employer resistance to
the General Counsel's prosecution of complaints is often based on different measures of costs and benefits; the costs of litigation are weighed
aginst the costs of unionization. 337 Where the employer wishes to resist
unionization efforts, the delay factor of the litigation becomes a positive
aspect of the process rather than an expense to be avoided if compliance
is less costly. Thus, regardless of the merits of an unfair labor practice
complaint, the employer will benefit from the time consumed by litigating
the issues during a union organizational campaign or during collective
bargaining for an initial contract, as the delay involved in litigation also
works to dissipate union strength. The provision of attorney's fees under
the standards of the EAJA, therefore, rewards such employers twice for
their litigation; first, through the collateral benefit of the litigation delay,
secondly, by creating the potential for fee awards under a standard which
places unprecedented burdens on the government as litigant.
The inappropriateness of the EAJA standards for fee awards to
respondents litigating unfair labor practice complaints was raised by a
critic of S. 265 during congressional hearings. 338 As noted by this witness,
the premise that defendants will not contest government prosecution
where the penalties are not costly collapses in face of the remedial scheme
under the NLRA. 339 Many unfair labor practices are remedied simply by
the issuance of a cease and desist order and by requiring the respondent to
post a remedial notice. These mild remedial measures are provided as the
sole course of legal action to counter serious violations, such as unlawful
refusals to bargain, where the respondent is simply ordered to bargain in
good faith. 340 Even where monetary relief is granted, the cost is reduced
by the prohibition against punitive damages and the requirement to

335. H.R. REP. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 9, reprintedin 1980 U.S. CODE CONG.& AD.
NEws at 4988.
336. See supra notes 76-92 and accompanying text.
337. Id.; See supranote 83.
338. Hearingson S. 265, supranote 278, at 85 (statement of Nan Aron, Director, Council for
Public Interest Law).
339. Id.
340. See supranote 78.
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deduct interim earnings from back pay.34' Given the cost-benefit premise
of the EAJA, therefore, respondents eligible for awards under the EAJA
should be expected rarely, if ever, to contest complaints issued by the
General Counsel. As noted in the House Judiciary Committee hearings,
however, "every year a significant number of the NLRB's complaints are
342
challenged."
Another fallacy of the rationale for the EAJA, especially as applied
to the Board's processes, is the view that the private litigant, the respondent before the ALJ and NLRB, is serving a public purpose by resisting the
government's enforcement efforts. The premise fails when the respondent's role is analyzed in light of the Board's discussion in Heck's. Using the
Board's approach in Heck's, the respondent would not be viewed as
fulfilling a public purpose by litigating the unfair labor practice issues.
The Board found that the charging party's role in furthering the public
interest by initiating and litigating unfair labor practice charges was "incidental" to fulfillment of its private interests. 343 Though the Board's view
may be criticized as unduly narrow, it does place the respondent's role in
such litigation in a more realistic perspective than the overly broad characterization in the legislative history of the EAJA. In keeping with the
Board's view of private litigants, if a respondent's contest of an unfair
labor practice complaint fulfills any public interest in shaping Board
policy, it surely must be incidental to its private interests. Logically, the
respondent's role in furthering the public interest is less than the charging
party's, as the enforcement of employee rights under the NLRA depends
solely on the initial efforts of the charging party. 3 4 Given the imbalance of
the roles of furthering important public policies, there is no justification
for providing easier access to fee awards to a respondent under the EAJA
standards, as compared to the stringent standards for fee awards to a
charging party.
Another area which presents problems for equitable application of
the EAJA concerns cases where the Board and the courts of appeals
disagree on the proper interpretation of the NLRA. There are many
examples of cases where circuit courts refuse to enforce Board orders
because of the theoretical splits between the circuit courts and the
NLRB.345 NLRB Member Zimmerman recently stated that this conflict
341. Phelps Dodgev. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 197-98 (1941); F.W. Woolworth Co., 90 N.L.R.B.
289, 26 L.R.R.M. 1185 (1950); See Murphy, supra note 82, at 65-66.
342. Hearingson S.265, supra note 278, at 85 (statement of Nan Aron, Director, Council for
Public Interest Law).
343. See supratext accompanying note 140.
344. See supratext accompanying notes 133-34.
345. See Zimmerman and Dunn, Relations between the NLRB and the CourtsofAppeals: A
Tale of Acrimony and Accommodation, 8 EMPLOYEE RELATIONS L.J. 4 (1982) (examples used of
issues upon which Circuit Courts and the Board have disagreed: shifting burdens of proof; bargaining
units in health care facilities; discipline of union stewards for illegal strike participation; interpretation
of the secondary boycott publicity proviso).
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between the NLRB and the circuit courts proves that "[flew relationships
between governmental entities are as fraught with potential for conflict as
is that of administrative agencies and the courts that review their decisions."346 Zimmerman also criticized the courts' failure to defer to reasonable decisions even though the courts may disagree with the Board's
theory. 347
For example, one area where conflict has developed between the
Board and the courts is in the interpretation of the meaning of protected
concerted activities. In Krispy Kreme Doughnut Corp.,348 the Board held
that an employer violated Section 8(a)(1) by discharging an employee in
retaliation for his expressed intention to file a workmen's compensation
claim. 349 The Board found that in pursuing a worker's compensation
claim, the employee seeks benefits which "arise out of the employment
relationship and are of common interest to other employees." 350 Therefore, the discharged employee had engaged in concerted action to the
mutual benefit of all employees, even though physically the employee had
acted individually.351 The Board reasoned that the discharged employee's
action was made in opposition to the employer's attempt to deny him and
other employees access to worker's compensation benefits. 352 The Sixth
Circuit denied enforcement of the Board's order based on its view that the
employee acted only for his individual benefit, rejecting the Board's
broader definition of concerted activities. 353
Despite denial of enforcement in a circuit court of appeals, the Board
is not required to, and often does not, adjust its interpretation of national
labor policy; only upon final review by the United States Supreme Court
must the Board follow the policy formulation of a higher tribunal. 354
Thus, the NLRB may continue following its definition of concerted activity under Krispy Kreme, despite the Sixth Circuit's refusal to enforce the
Board's orders. 355 The Board has also clashed with other circuit courts in
346. Id.at 4.
347. Id at 4-5.
348. 245 N.L.R.B. 1053, 102 L.R.R.M. 1492 (1979).
349. Id at 1053.
350. Id
351. Id. The Board relied on Self Cycle & Marine Distrib. Co., Inc., 237 N.L.R.B. 75, 98
L.R.R.M. 1517 (1978), holding that an employer violated Section 8(a)(l) by discharging an employee
for pursuing an unemployment compensation claim. 245 N.L.R.B. at 1053, 102 L.R.R.M. at 1493,
352. Id
353. 635 F.2d 304 (6th Cir. 1980).
354. See e.g., Country Club of Little Rock, 260 N.L.R.B. No. 151 n.19 (ALJ decision), 109
L.R.R.M. 1301 (1982)
355. Since the Sixth Circuit's decision, the Board has continued to apply a broad definition of
concerted activity. See, e.g., Country Club of Little Rock, 260 N.L.R.B. 1112, 109 L.R.R.M. 1301
(1982) (Board adopted the AU's recommended findings that an employer violated Section 8(a)(1) by
discharging an employee for filing a sex discrimination charge with the EEOC); Hotel and Restaurant
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defining concerted activity. In one case, the Board found that an
employee had engaged in protected concerted activity when she filed a sex
discrimination complaint with a state agency against her employer. 356 In
reaching its holding, the Board specifically refused to follow the Ninth
Circuit's narrow view of concerted activity "until such time as the
357
Supreme Court may determine the issue."
The adversary relationship between the Board and the courts poses
problems under the EAJA. Under 28 U.S.C. §2412(d)(3), a federal court
reviewing the merits of an agency adjudication must award attorneys' fees
unless the government proves the substantial justification or special circumstances criteria. Further, the legislative history identifies a case where
a prior suit on the same claim has been dismissed as one which "clearly
raise[s] the possibility that the Government was unreasonable in pursuing
the litigation. 3 58 Thus, under the EAJA, the circuit court could chili the
Board's enforcement efforts by punishing the Board for its refusal to
change its interpretation of the NLRA to comply with that circuit.
At least one circuit court appears to have recognized the problem of
awarding fees based on a split between the NLRB and the circuit courts.
In Wyandotte Savings Bank v. NLRB, 59 the employer sought attorneys'
fees under the EAJA in the Sixth Circuit based on the court's earlier
360
refusal to enforce the NLRB's bargaining order against the employer.
The court had denied enforcement on the ground that the bargaining unit
certified by the Board was inappropriate, and contrary to Sixth Circuit
precedent. 361 In denying the employer's application for attorneys' fees, the
court found that the Board was substantially justified in seeking enforce-

Employees and Bartenders Union, Local 28, 252 N.L.R.B. 1124, 105 L.R.R.M. 1444 (1980)
(employer violated Section 8(a)(1) by discharging an employee for filing a sex discrimination charge
with a state agency); United Investment Corp. d/b/a/ Santa's Bakery, 249 N.L.R.B. 1058, 104
L.R.R.M. 1248 (1980) (employer violated Section 8(a)(1) by discharging an employee for filing a
claim for a governmental agency for back overtime wages).
356. Hotel and Restaurant Employees and Bartenders Union, Local 38, 252"N.L.R.B. 1124,
105 L.R.R.M. 1444 (1980).
357. Id.at 1124, 105 L.R.R.M. at 1444. In Country Club of Little Rock, the AJ, in finding an
8(a)(1) violation, noted the conflict with the Circuit Courts on the definition of"concerted activity".""1
am aware of the fact, as pointed out by the Respondent, that certain U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal
[sic] have refused to find that the actions of a single employee action alone constitute 'concerted
activity' within the meaning of the Act, at least in the absence of a collective-bargaining agreement.
However, I am bound by Board precedent which is clear and consistent in holding that actions of the
kind involved here constitute protected concerted activity." 260 N.L.R.B. 1112, I115 n.19 (1982) (AL
decision).
358. H.R. REP. No. 1418, 9th Cong., 2d Sess. II, reprintedin 1980 U.S. CODE CONG.& AD.
NEws at 4989-90.
359. 682 F.2d 119 (6th Cir. 1982).
360. Id. at 119.
361. Id. at 119-20.
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ment of its bargaining order, despite the fact that the Sixth Circuit had
reversed the Board's position on the same issue in an earlier case. 362 In
Wyandotte, the court identified factors which justified the Board's "reasonable attempt to reopen a closed question. 3 63 The court noted that at
least two other circuits had upheld the Board's position and that two
judges on the Sixth Circuit "have indicated support for the position taken
by the Board." 364 Thus, in Wyandotte, the court was able to avoid the
difficult issue of awarding fees where a Board order is contrary to that
circuit's precedent. Other circuit courts will surely be faced with this
365
problem in other areas.
2. Pragmatic Problems
In addition to the theoretical difficulties in applying the EAJA to the
Board, a number of pragmatic problems have arisen in the early attempts
to litigate under the EAJA in specific Board cases.
The concern about the cost of litigating the fee question is particularly appropriate for the NLRB. During the first year of the implementation of the EAJA, almost half of the 103 applications filed with federal
agencies, were filed with the NLRB. 366 General Counsel William Lubbers
has stated that the large percentage of applications to the Board was
367
anticipated, as the NLRB's caseload is greater than other agencies.
During that same year, over half of the 14,000 agency adversary adjudications were Board cases. 368 This pattern follows the Board's greater use of
its adjudicative over its rule making powers. 369
The costs of litigating the fee question have come, in part, from use
of Board attorneys' time. According to Deputy General Counsel John

362. Id. at 120.
363. Id.
364. Id.
365. In Enerhaul, Inc. v. NLRB, 710 F.2d 748 (11th Cir. 1983), the Eleventh Circuit awarded
attorneys' fees under the EAJA, in a case which censures the Board for refusing to interpret "protected concerted activities" in accordance with conservative Eleventh Circuit precedent. In the underlying case, the AiU dismissed the complaint alleging that the charging party employee had been
discharged for his complaints about job conditions. Id. at 749-50. Both the AL and the Board found
that under the EAJA the General Counsel was substantially justified, as the General Counsel had
established a primafaciecase, though the allegations had not ultimately been proven. The Circuit
Court, however, awarded fees based on its precedent, holding that individual griping and complaining are not protected concerted activity. Id. at 751, citing NLRB v. Charles H. McCauley Assocs., 657
F.2d 685, 688 (5th Cir. 1981); NLRB v. Datapoint Corp., 642 F.2d 123, 128-29 (5th Cir. 1981);
NLRB v. Buddies Suppermarket, 481 F.2d 714,717-19 (5th Cir. 1973).
366. Memorandum GC83-11, supranote 16, at 112 n.l.
367. Id. at -112.
368. Id.
369. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974); NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394
U.S. 759 (1969).
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Higgins, the costs incurred from loss of staff efforts on other Board work
have had "[t]he most substantial impact this Agency has experienced thus
far with respect to [EAJA].... 7 0 Other costs are incurred from hiring
experts on issues of determining the net worth of the prevailing respond-

ent. For example, in one case described by Lubbers in his memorandum
reviewing the NLRB's first year experience under the EAJA, an outside
accountant was hired for advice on the net worth issue, which was being
strongly contested by both parties. 371 The employer in that case claims a
net worth of 4.7 million dollars. 372 The new layer of litigation on the net
worth issue includes questions about the method of employer's computa3 73
tion of net worth.
Issues of pre-trial discovery present areas of conflict between the
EAJA and Board procedures. In one case, the AJ ordered broad discovery, including interrogatories and depositions of Board agents concerning the General Counsel's claim that the respondent had refused to
cooperate during the initial unfair labor practice investigation.374 The
NLRB subsequently ruled that the Board's rule prohibiting discovery also
applies to EAJA proceedings. 375 Since a respondent's willingness to supply

evidence in an investigation is often important in determining whether a
prima facie case exists warranting issuance of a complaint, such discovery
procedures could forseeably result in swearing contests between Board
370. OversightHearing on the EqualAccess to Justice Act Before the Subcomm. on Agency
Administration ofthe Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,97th Cong. 2d Sess. at 130 (1982) [hereinafter
cited as Oversight Hearing]. See Peterson, supranote 244 at n.4.
371. Memorandum GC83-11, supranote 16, at 113.
372. Id.
373. Id.
374. Id. Lubbers described the litigation over this issue in his memorandum. The ALJ relied
solely on Section 102.152 of the NLRB's EAJA rules in ordering pre-trial discovery. Id. Section
102.152, states, in relevant part: "(a) Ordinarily the determination of an award will be made on the
basis of the documents in the record. The administrative law judge, however... may order further
proceedings, including an informal conference, oral argument, additional written submissions or an
evidentiary hearing." 29 C.F.R. §102.152 (1983).
375. Memorandum GC 83-11, supra note 16, at 113. The Board order was issued after
granting special permission to appeal. The Board relied on Section 102.118 of the Board's rules which
provides in relevant part:
(a)(1) Except as provided in section 102.117 of these rules respecting requests cognizable
under the Freedom of Information Act, no regional director, field examiner, administrative
law judge, attorney, specially designated agent, general counsel, member of the Board, or
other officer or employee of the Board shall produce or present any files, documents,
reports, memoranda, or records of the Board or of the general counsel, whether in respone
to a subpoena duces tecum or otherwise, without the written consent of the Board... or of
the general counsel. Nor shall any such person testify in behalf of any party to any cause
pending in any court or before the Board... with respect to any information, facts, or
other matter coming to his knowledge in his official capacity or with respect to the contents
of any ... records of the Board or the general counsel, whether in answer to a subpoena or
otherwise, without the written consent of the Board... or the general counsel ....
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agents and a respondent's attorneys. 376 Further, the general continuance
of Board policies protecting the confidentiality of witnesses who give
affidavits to the General Counsel must be kept intact for the reasons
377
approved by the Supreme Court in Robbins Tire.
Another area of interpretation of the EAJA which has resulted ih
confusion, and which affects all agencies and courts is the search for the
meaning of the government's "position." The recurring issue is whether
Congress intended to examine the reasonableness of government's position underlying the cause of action or whether the term refers only to the
government's position during the course of litigation.3 78 The federal courts
which have addressed the issue have split on the proper definition.
The District Court for the District of Columbia decided that the
government's "position" referred to the underlying facts of the cause of
action, as well as the government's legal theories in litigating the issues. 379
The district court in Maryland concluded "that the statute refers to the
Government's actions or position in prosecuting or defending litigation,
not to its actions upon which suit is based." 380 A federal district court in
Utah agreed with this interpretation of the meaning of "position," finding
that this definition would carry out the intent of Congress to compensate
only certain parties in litigation against the government. 38t
The issue of the government's position under the EAJA has also
been addressed by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Tyler Business
Services v. NLRB. 82 Part of the court's analysis in granting the employer's application for attorneys' fees concerned the definition of the
government's position, which the court decided "should be read to mean
the government's position as a party in prosecuting or defending the
litigation at whatever level is under review for the awarding of attorneys'
376. One commentator on the EAJA and NLRB procedures argues that the burden of proof
on the General Counsel in EAJA cases requires the General Counsel to produce evidence of the
reasons for a respondent's refusal to supply evidence in the form of affidavits. Peterson, supra note
244, at 274.
377. NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214 (1978). In criticizing the Board's
refusal to disclose affidavits of witnesses with regard to EAJA cases, Peterson, an attorney commenting on EAJA, completely ignores the Robbins 27re decision. Peterson, supranote 244, at 271.
378. See Equal Access, supra note 244, at 320-21.
379. Photo Data, Inc., v. Sawyer, 533 F. Supp. 348, 352 (D.D.C. 1982). See Equal Access,
supra note 244, at 321 n.129, for discussion of cases from federal district courts in Pennsylvania,
Idaho and Oklahoma, applying this definition of "position." See also Spencer v. NLRB, 712 F.2d 539
(D.C. Cir. 1983) (examination of both the underlying facts and litigation theories "seems more
sensible and consistent with the purposes of the EAJA.. . ." Id. at 556).
380. Alspach v. District Director of Internal Revenue, 527 F.Supp. 225, 228 (D. Md. 1981).
381. Operating Eng'rs Local Union No.3 v. Bohn, 541 F. Supp. 486, 495 (D. Utah 1982). See
also S. & H. Riggers & Erectors, Inc. v. Occupational Safetj & Health Rev. Comm., 672 F.2d 426,
430 (5th Cir. 1982); Berman v. Schweiker, 531 F. Supp. 1149, 1154 (N.D. I11.
1982), affd, 713 F.2d
1298 (7th Cir. 1983).
382. 695 F.2d 73 (4th Cir. 1982).
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fees." 383 Thus, the court awarded fees based on its review of the government's position in petitioning the court for enforcement of the prior
Board order finding the employer guilty of an unlawful discharge. 384 The
court also noted that it would review only the reasonableness of the
General Counsel's litigation position as the prosecuting arm of the
NLRB, and not the position of the Board as adjudicator. 385 Examination
of the court's decision, however, shows that the court was in fact reviewing the Board's position. In Tyler, the ALJ had dismissed the complaint in
its entirety, which consisted of allegations of threats in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and a discharge in violation of Sections 8(a)(3) and (1).386 The
NLRB affirmed the AL's recommendation in part, reversing the dismissal of the discharge case, having found that the employee had been discharged because of his protected concerted activity apart from union
activity.387 The Circuit Court denied enforcement sought by the General
Counsel because his position did not adequately explain the employee's
own disclaimer of engaging in the concerted activity.388 Thus, despite the
court's stated restriction of its review only of the position of the General
Counsel, the court was necessarily reviewing the reasonableness of the
Board's position in adopting a theory different from the General Counsel's initial theory of a discharge based on union activities. 389 Thus, after
the court's decision in Tyler, the question of which position was intended
by Congress is still confusing and is further complicated by the question
390
of whose position is under review.
Other problems with applying the Fourth Circuit's definition of the
government's "position" can be envisioned. One problem may arise concerning an employer who has refused to cooperate in producing evidence
during the investigation of an unfair labor practice charge. If this occurs
in a case such as an alleged unlawful discharge, is the government's
position in litigation not substantially justified if the employer produces
business records at the trial which show that the employee would have
been discharged regardless of the union activity? Another situation which
may arise is the disappearance of a witness whose testimony was essential
383. Al at 75.
3.84. Id. at 76.
385. Id.
386. Id.
387. Id See Tyler Business Servs. Inc., 256 N.L.R.B. 567, 107 L.R.R.M. 1294 (1981).
388. 695 F.2d at 76. The federal circuit court denied enforcement at 680 F.2d 338 (4th Cir.
1982).
389. Id. at 75.
390. In contrast to the review of the General Couisel's litigation position in Tyler, the ALJ in
Lion Uniform, JanesvilleApparel Division, JD-(ATL)-76-83 (Sept. 13, 1978), examined the facts
and evidence underlying the issuance of the complaint. The ALT concluded that the General Counsel's position was not substantially justified and recommended that the respondent employer be
awarded attorneys' fees under the EAJA in the amount of $90,564.65.
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to prove an allegation. For example, if the General Counsel cannot locate
an individual who is the sole witness to an illegal statement, at that point
in the litigation, is the government's position without substantial justification, even though the allegation was based on that witness' affidavit
during the investigation? These issues will undoubtedly be presented in
future cases interpreting the EAJA, and may conceivably lead to varied
and confusing interpretations of the statute by different tribunals.
CONCLUSION:

A

COMPARISON OF SECTION

10(C)

AND THE

EAJA

Juxtaposition of the standards for awarding attorneys' fees under
Section 10(c) of the NLRA with the fee provisions of the EAJA demonstrates the ineffectiveness of Board fee shifting policy under Section 10(c)
and illuminates the validity of the general objections made in the congressional hearings that enactment of the EAJA standards would result in
illogical and inequitable fee shifting policies.
The foregoing discussion has shown the extreme difficulty facing a
charging party seeking attorneys' fees under Section 10(c), because of the
stringent standards established in Tiidee Products and Heck's. Though
the remedial policies und&r Section 10(c) weigh in favor of the Board's
power to award fees, the Board has applied the frivolous/debatable
standard narrowly and reluctantly.3 91 Thus, where fee awards under the
common law exceptions are extraordinary in general, by the NLRB's
standards such awards become almost mythical. The overly restrictive
application of the Board's fee shifting standards is demonstrated by comparison with federal court fee awards. Even assuming that the Board is
not empowered to award attorneys' fees beyond the parameters of the
common law exceptions, the Board has refused to order fees in cases
which would have easily fallen within the bad faith exception to the
American Rule as applied by the federal courts. 392 Under its conservative
approach, the Board has refused to award fees both in cases involving bad
faith conduct underlying the lawsuit as well as bad faith conduct during
393
the actual litigation.
The Board has applied its overly stringent standards for fee shifting
even in cases involving recidivist violators, with the narrowest exception
394
for rare respondents such as the notorious J.P. Stevens Company.
Furthermore, under the current Board approach recidivism has become a
double edged sword. On the one hand, recidivism without the most
frivolous defenses will result in a denial of attorneys' fees. However, the
391.
392.
393.
394.

See supra notes 184-241 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 192-204, 216-24, 230-40 and accompanying text.
Id
See supra notes 205-13 and accompanying text.
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Board has recently denied attorneys' fees where the defenses were frivolous but the respondent was not yet a repeat offender. 395 Such Board
policy gives a respondent one free round of frivolous litigation.
The Board's reluctance to award attorneys' fees against respondents
who act in bad faith, either in conduct leading to the lawsuit, or in
conduct during the course of litigation, results in the ineffective use of a
potentially strong remedial measure under a statute which provides primarily weak remedies. Enforcement of the NLRA relies solely on the
initiation and litigation of charges by a charging party. Lengthy litigation
of unfair labor practice complaints against respondents who take advantage of the delay inherent in Board processes becomes expensive and
drains the resources of a union, particularly in litigation against repeat
violators. 396 Thus, the award of attorneys' fees, at least within the bad
faith exception, would encourage charging party unions to file charges
and follow through with the litigation process. The Board's present fee
shifting policies achieve the opposite result by adding obstacles to awarding attorneys' fees. Unions with limited litigation resources will, therefore,
be deterred from pursuing lengthy and expensive litigation of unfair labor
practice charges.
By contrast, the EAJA creates relaxed standards for fee shifting
unprecedented in the history of the American Rule and its exceptions.
Not only is the burden of proof placed on the government, but the
construction of the statute creates a presumption against the government,
triggered by the simple allegation that the government's actions were not
substantially justified. 397 As a result, the EAJA standards make it easier
for prevailing defendants to win attorneys' fees than in any other statutory
scheme short of automatic awards. Prior to the EAJA, fee shifting statutes took a pro-plaintiff bias, as an outgrowth of the underlying "private
attorney general" theory of encouraging litigation to enforce important
public policies. Criticism of the EAJA's major change in fee shifting
policy has been based on the lack of justification for such major revisions
as well as the potential chilling effect that such anti-government, pro398
defendant legislation may have on enforcement of public policies.
The problems identified with the EAJA also stem from its overly
broad and ambiguous terms. The provisions for eligibility of parties are
so broad as to exclude very few of the millions of businesses in the United
States, despite the stated legislative purpose of encouraging small businesses to litigate against the government where they might otherwise be
395.
396.
397.
398.

See supra notes 216-24 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 79-86 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 308-25 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 280-84, 298-307, 328-32 and accompanying text.
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deterred by, litigation expenses.3 99 Further, the actual wording of the
eligibility provisions is broader than indicated by the legislative history,
creating ambiguity as to proper interpretation. Other ambiguities are
found in the meaning of the government's "position"; courts have
diverged on examining either the government's position underlying the
action or its litigation position. 40
Comparison of fee shifting under Section 10(c) with the EAJA
standards demonstrates the resulting problems and inequities. As a result
of the pro-defendant bias of the EAJA, the prevailing charging party
before the NLRB must shoulder a far greater burden of proof on the issue
of fee shifting than the prevailing respondent. Specifically, the prevailing
charging party bears the heavy burden of showing that the respondent has
litigated "frivolous" defenses as defined by Tiidee Products, while the
prevailing respondent's burden of going forward is met with its allegation
that the government's action was not substantially justified. This disparity
is insupportable. First, the different standards of proof for the charging
party and the respondent do not comport with notions of logic or justice.
Where the charging party furthers public policy by filing and litigating
charges under the NLRA, it is inequitable to place a higher standard of
proof for fee shifting on the charging party, than on the respondent whose
litigation against the NLRB and the charging party fulfills more personal
interests in successfully defending against the charge and remaining
union-free. 401 These inconsistencies are highlighted by comparison with
the Supreme Court's interpretation of the fee shifting provisions of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in ChristiansburgGarment Co. as
applying a higher standard of proof for prevailing defendants than for
prevailing plaintiffs. 4 2 While this example is different from fee shifting for
parties before the NLRB in that Title VII contains explicit fee shifting
provisions, the "equitable considerations" which support the disparate
standards in ChristiansburgGarment Co. are valid considerations for
Board litigation -as well. The equities stemming from the position of the
charging party tnder the NLRA as the sole initiator of enforcement of
national labor policy demand that the charging party's burden of proof
under Section 10(c) should not be so disproportionate to the burden of
the prevailing respondent under the EAJA. The unequal treatment of the
parties is even less justifiable in light of the fact that there has been
absolutely no objective evidence that the NLRB has a pattern of badfaith
or unreasonable prosecatibns which would support the general accusa399.
400.
401.
402.

See supra notes 288-97 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 379-90 and accompanying text.
Seesupra notes 83, 132-33 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text.
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tions of governmental harassment made by the proponents of the

EAJA.403
The disparate treatment of the charging party and the respondent
also works both to encourage and discourage litigation in a manner
inconsistent with vigorous enforcement of the NLRA. Because of the
delay factor inherent in Board litigation at all stages, litigation by a
charging party union against a respondent employer taking advantage of
all appellate routes becomes extremely expensive. Instead of encouraging
charging parties to pursue such litigation, however, the current fee shifting
standards under Section 10(c) discourage a union with limited litigation
resources from carrying through with charges against an employer resisting enforcement, with a resulting chilling effect on vigorous enforcement
of national"labor policy. On the other hand, the relaxed standards of the
EAJA will fulfill the legislative intent of encouraging respondents to
litigate against the General Counsel and the charging party. However, as
noted in the previous discussion of the weaknesses in Board remedies, the
benefits from the delay in Board litigation already induce some respondent employers to litigate through the entire appellate route. 0 4 Therefore,
the attorneys' fees award under the EAJA is an unnecessary inducement
to litigation, and in some cases, may reward employers whose principal
purpose for defending against unfair labor practice charges was to
weaken support for the union. These realities of litigation before the
Board may provide a double inducement to the employer to litigate unfair
labor practice cases; the first from the time involved in litigation, and the
sepond from potential payment for that same litigation time. The fee
award under the EAJA thus may result in a windfall to certain employers.
The windfall factor is even more inequitable in light of the overly broad
eligibility standards, which do not identify parties who would be deterred
from litigation without the potential for fee awards. Further, the -time
spent by Board personnel in litigating the fee questions exacerbates the
chilling effect on actual enforcement of the NLRA. 405
Another area fraught with potential problems of enforcement of the
EAJA in Board proceedings is the well-known conflict between the Board
and federal appellate courts regarding interpretation of labor policy. 40 6
The EAJA provisions authorize the circuit courts of appeals to award
attorneys' fees to respondents following review of the merits of a Board
order in unfair labor practice cases. Thus, the EAJA may be used as a
tool to create Board policy consistent with the views of the federal
courts. 40 7 Where the federal courts' interpretation of the NLRA results in
403.
404.
405.
406.
407.

See supra notes 328-32 and accompanying text.
See supra -notes79-86 and accompanying text.
Sei supranotes 285-87, 370-73 and accompanying text.
See supranotes 345-65 and accompanying text.
Id.
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less expansive views of employee rights, however, the EAJA may again
discourage vigorous enforcement of the NLRA.
The result of applying both the Board's Section 10(c) fee shifting
standards and those of the EAJA is to "turn[ ] the American Rule on its
head." 40S Under present Board policy, it is almost impossible for a prevailing charging party to successfully seek attorneys' fees. By contrast, the
EAJA creates relaxed standards for a prevailing respondent unprecedented in the history of fee shifting policy. Taken alone, either the Section
10(c) or the EAJA standards violate the traditional use of attorneys' fees
awards to encourage enforcement of important public policies. In combination, the standards misapply fee shifting concepts with the inevitable
result of deterring vigorous enforcement of the NLRA.
In general, the ChristiansburgGarment standard proposed by the
Department of Justice could provide the vehicle for deterring the
government from bad faith prosecutions, while preserving the proplaintiff tradition of American fee shifting policy.409 In particular, with
regard to the NLRB processes, the ChristiansburgGarment standard is
far more equitable in light of the stringent Tiidee Productsstandard for
prevailing charging parties. Furthermore, the pro-plaintiff tradition of fee
shifting requires the NLRB to fully exercise its fee shifting authority to
encourage the enforcement of national labor policy.

408. Hearings on S. 265, supra note 278, at 80 (statement of Armand Derfner, Lawyer's
Committee for Civil Rights Under Laws).
409. See supranotes 278-82, 333 and accompanying text.
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